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ABSTRACT
In November 1992, the United States withdrew its military forces from facilities in
the Republic of the Philippines. The United States must now reassess its commitments,
and the means and policies it will employ in protecting and promoting its national interests
in the post-Cold War era. This thesis examines the author's perceived global national
interests of the United States in the post-Cold War era, based upon the Preamble of the
United States Constitution. United States national interests abroad include protection of
American lives and property, economic prosperity, and international goodwill. The
perceived national interests of the United States in the East-Asia/Pacific (EA/P) Region,
with particular emphasis placed on the Southeast Asian sub-region, are discussed. This
thesis then examines the political, social, and economic evolution of the Southeast Asian
sub-region, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and historical
United States national interests in the Southeast Asian sub-region. Past means and policies
of the United States to protect and promote its interests in the Southeast Asian sub-region
are reviewed. Finally, the opportunities and challenges now facing the United States in
devising future means and policies to promote and protect United States national interests,
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
With the departure of United States' military forces from facilities in the Republic
of the Philippines, the United States has been given the opportunity and challenge to
reassess its commitments and capabilities in protecting its national interests on the far
side of the Pacific. The success or failure, on the part of the United States, to rise to this
occasion will surely determine the degree to which it can claim to be tomorrow's leader.
Realizing that the United States has permanent long term interests all other the
world (including Southeast Asia), the recent departure of the United States from Subic
Bay in the Philippines does not allow for the United States to abandon those interests,
or weaken its capacity to protect and promote those interests that remain. A permanent
United States military presence in the East-Asia/Pacific (EA/P) region, although adjusted
for the post-Cold War environment, is universally desired. However, with the current
state of the art of war and technology, so visibly demonstrated during the Gulf War, the
United States can (presumably) allow for a readjustment of presence without
jeopardizing its own survival.
As the United States takes a new look across the Pacific, it must modify its past
policies to maintain their effectiveness. There is no longer any common enemy to
pretend to contain. All nations must be considered as friendly until proven otherwise.
When countries share common interests, there is generally no need for an alliance. The
non-aligned countries can no longer be dismissed as insignificant in global and regional
balances of power.
In refining past policies to determine their validity in a post-Cold War world, the
opinions of other concerned nations cannot be overlooked or ignored. Each Asian nation
ix
is developing in its own way, at its own pace, and will "democratize" as conditions
allow. Dislocations between the market-driven countries and the former centrally-
planned countries are enormous, and the needs and concerns of each nation in
alleviating the disparity between the economic haves and have nots must be considered.
As the United States continues to capitalize on its peace dividend, long range
trends indicate that the United States will be actively involved and committed in EA/P
stability and progress. United States national interests in the region are significant and
rapidly growing. As the United States continues its efforts at domestic economic
renewal, new arrangements for the stability and progress of the entire EA/P region must
be fostered. These arrangements will run the entire gamut of security, economics, and
international goodwill. Every nation from Russia, Japan and Korea in the northeast to
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the southeast must be engaged
in continuous dialogue. Security frameworks must now be based on the common
interests and concerns of all nations.
Realizing that the post-Cold War era is going to be more competitive in economic
than military terms, the mighty United States must update its economic productivity and
prowess to match its vaunted military power. The role of nonmilitary methods in
protecting and promoting United States national interests must be restructured and
enhanced to effectively reflect the post-Cold War environment.
The embarrassments and difficulties which now characterize domestic conditions
within the United States, make it amply evident that the security and economic burdens
accepted by the United States have been excessive. The old philosophy of the Cold War
is gone. It is no longer enough to maximize American military strength to contain a
x
common enemy. It is now incumbent on American policy makers to take a
proportionate role in the quest for a new world order of benefit to everyone. Security
planners must give constant consideration to the interests and images of other concerned
nations because the United States does not always know what is best for other countries.
xi
1. INTRODUCTION
Since the beginning of perestroika and qlasnost, the
United States' view of the world, and the contributions it
intends to make towards that world, have been in a constant
state of flux. The collapse of the Soviet Union has left the
United States alone as the only legitimate superpower for a
brief moment in history. Realizing the instability inherent
in such a condition, the United states is now working to
accomplish a new global system, for example a "tripolar world,
driven by the Americas, by Europe, and by Asia."
(Ref. 1] While this tripolar economic system has been
in place for over a decade now, in the long run a series of
other power centers such as China, India, Brazil, and even
Nigeria could possibly emerge.
While the global system is being redefined, a new regional
balance of power game is under way in East Asia and the
Pacific (EA/P). With the departure of the United States'
military forces from facilities in the Republic of the
Philippines, the United States has been given the challenge
and the opportunity to reassess its commitments and
capabilities in protecting its national interests on the far
side of the Pacific. This paper is particularly concerned
with the sub-region of Southeast Asia.
The success or failure, on the part of the United States,
to rise to this occasion will surely determine the degree to
which it can claim to be tomorrow's leader. The United States
appears to be free to pursue its own parochial national
interests without worrying about the defense of the "free
world." Where its national interests coincide with the
national interests of others, the United States will act
multilaterally or collectively. Where its national interests
conflict with others, the United States must act
independently, and make its own judgments how far to intervene
or to stay at home.
Realizing that the United States has permanent long term
interests all over the world (including Southeast Asia), the
recent departure of the United States from Subic Bay in the
Philippines does not allow for the United States to abandon
those interests, or weaken its capacity to protect and promote
those interests that remain. A permanent United States
military presence in the EA/P region, although adjusted for
the post-Cold war environment, is universally desired.
However, with the current state of the art of war and
technology, so visibly demonstrated during the Gulf War, the
United States can (presumably) allow for a readjustment of
presence without jeopardizing its own survival.
As the United States takes a new look across the Pacific,
it must modify its past policies to maintain their
effectiveness. Realizing that the post-Cold War era is going
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to be more competitive in economic than military terms, the
mighty United States must update its economic productivity to
match its vaunted military power. In refining past policies
to determine their validity in a post-Cold War world, the
opinions of other concerned nations cannot be overlooked or
ignored.
The embarrassments and difficulties which now characterize
domestic conditions within the United States, make it amply
evident that the security and economic burdens accepted by the
United States have been excessive. New arrangements for the
stability and progress of the entire EA/P region must be
fostered, and they will run the entire gamut of security,
economics and international goodwill. Every nation from
Russia, Japan and Korea in the northeast to the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the southeast must be
engaged in continuous dialogue. The old philosophy of the
Cold War is gone. It is no longer enough to maximize American
military strength to contain a common enemy. It is now
incumbent on American policy makers to take a proportionate
role in the quest for a new world order of benefit to
everyone.
This thesis examines the author's perceived global
national interests of the United States in the post-Cold War
era, based upon the Preamble of the United States
Constitution. United States national interests abroad include
protection of American lives and property, economic
3
prosperity, and international goodwill. The perceived
national interests of the United States in the EA/P region,
with particular emphasis placed on the Southeast Asian sub-
region, are discussed. This thesis then examines the
political, social, and economic evolution of the Southeast
Asian sub-region, including the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN), and historical United States national
interests in the Southeast Asian sub-region. Past means and
policies of the United States to protect and promote its
interests in the Southeast Asian sub-region are reviewed.
Finally, the opportunities and challenges now facing the
United States in devising future means and policies to promote
and protect United States national interests, as well as those
of other nations, in the EA/P region are explained.
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I1. PERCEPTION OF NATIONAL INTERZSTS OF THE UNITED 8TATE8
Amidst the transformation taking place in international
relations, it is useful to bear in mind that United States
interests in Asia have been remarkably consistent over the
past two centuries: Commercial access to the region;
freedom of navigation; and the prevention of the rise of
any hegemonic power or coalition. [Ref. 21
A. AS DEFINED IN 1993 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
Before assessing United States regional national interests
in the EA/P region, United States global national interests
must be assessed. The 1993 National Security Strategy defines
United States global interests and objectives as follows:
"* The security of the United States as a free and
independent nation, and the protection of its fundamental
values, institutions and people.
"* Global and regional stability which encourages peaceful
change and progress.
"* Open, democratic and representative political systems
worldwide.
"* An open international trading and economic system which
benefits all participants.
"* An enduring global faith in America - that it can and will
lead in a collective response to the world's crisis.
[Ref. 31
D. UNOFFICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST
With the end of the Cold War, and subsequent detachment
from the Cold War ally/axis paradigm, the above national
interests leave one wanting in specific American values and
5
ideology. In short, what sets the United States national
interests apart from the rest of the world's nations' national
interests? They all say survival is essential. They all say
they desire a stable and secure world. Who speaks for
America? What does America stand for?
First of all, the protection of the United States as a
free and independent nation, and the protection of its
fundamental values and institutions, cannot be done by relying
on military methods alone. The security of the United States
as a free and independent nation along with the protection of
its fundamental values and institutions is the responsibility
of the American government acting on behalf of the American
people. A $4 trillion debt encroaches on the independence of
the United States and cannot be paid off by the Seventh Fleet.
Brotherhood, the underlying foundation of American values,
cannot be instilled by military coercion in a democracy.
Values can only be instilled through religious and civic
education. American institutions, which provide the
fundamental checks and balances on governmental power, can
only be eroded by the quality and integrity (character) of
personnel that staff them.
A second point of American uniqueness is its advocacy of
open, democratic and representative political systems
worldwide, along with supporting human rights. These
interests are allegedly paramount in the ideology that America
relies upon to project its values abroad. However, I question
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the practicality and advisability of doing so under this
facade in the post-cold war environment. While these are
wonderful ideological goals that were quite effective in
defeating the evil empire, they leave the United States open
to charges of hypocrisy', and encroach upon fundamental
national interests described below. Let me explain why.
I do not feel that the American people are in the mood to
support, or desire to fund, Pax-Americana. While extraneous
circumstances may have facilitated a Pax-Americana during the
Cold War (under the auspices of capitalist leadership versus
communist leadership), or a similar system may have been fine
for the British during Britain's imperial and colonial years,
it is not prudent or possible for the United States in today's
instant communications world. Furthermore, the United States
does not have the resources (time, money, wisdom, or popular
support) to pursue such an idealistic mission.2
America has been blessed with abundant natural resources
and with a geographical position that protects her coastlines
with vast oceans and unaggressive neighbors. These features
have allowed the United States to pursue democratic government
I We support King Fahd in Saudi Arabia which is hardly a
democracy. Are we going to force Saudi Arabia to pursue
democratic government? Do we really want to undermine his
legitimacy? Is it fair to allow his authoritarian rule while
bemoaning China for its authoritarian rule?
2 Continuing the pursuit of Pax-Americana will defacto
bequeath over $4 trillion in national debt to America's
posterity, essentially taxation without representation.
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by educating her citizens and building a wealthy nation. It
is unreasonable to expect other nations, without the same
advantages and resources, to be able to vigorously pursue
democratic government. We need only look to our experiment
for the past ninety-five years in the Philippines.
The United States annexed the Philippines in 1898, with
the intention of proving to the rest of the world that America
was different; it would make the Philippines the showcase of
American democracy. It is nearly a century later, substantial
resources (time, money, lives) have been devoted to the
development of the Philippines, and the Philippines is far
from any semblance of a democratic government that any
American citizen would tolerate. Gianted, the United States
has had her own periods of decay and development, but the
Philippines has only provided a democratic facade for the
entrenched oligarchy. The people of the countryside are
essentially serfs of the land-owning elite. Does the
Philippine government deserve to couch its legitimacy in the
name of democracy? To be more succinct,
When we pretend that supporting 'democracy' is paramount,
are we not kidding ourselves? When is 'democracy' in name
the same thing as 'democracy' in fact? Is a rigged
election sufficient to justify a claim to democracy? How
far can any state abuse the principles and practices of
democracy and still be entitled to its name? And since
when has the existence of a so-called democratic
government given any assurance that its policies will be
friendly? [Ref. 4]
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Thirdly, the United States is in no position to guarantee
or even define a universally recognized code of human rights.
The United Nations 1993 Vienna conference declared that
the promotion and protection of all human rights is a
legitimate concern of the international community.
However, each nation, each people has its own concepts of
human rights as opposed to the needs of society; and each will
react upon its own sovereign prerogative to enforce its own
ideas. It is presumptuous of the United States to preach to
others, for example China, Indonesia or the Philippines, about
ideals of human rights.
It is also important to recognize that the Judeo-Christian
value system is not at all superior to the Confucian, or any
other, value system. It is better to nurture good
relationships where value systems converge, instead of passing
judgement on comparative good. Asian governments resent the
United States pushing Western concepts of democracy and human
rights on them. They are working hard to develop and
modernize their nations while consistently improving the vital
statistics of their people. 3  They remain wary of working
closely with the United States in trade and security forums
because they fear that the United States will use such forums
to try to dictate democracy and human rights policies. The
purported national interest of promoting democracy and human
3 By vital statistics I mean life expectancy, literacy,
birth rates, per capita income.
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rights may even encroach upon the fundamental national
interest of economic prosperity for the citizens of the United
States. Would it not be better to judge governments by their
fruits, instead of their form? For these reasons, encouraging
democracy and human rights would be better stated as one
means/policy of promoting domestic tranquility and domestic
justice, not an end. Therefore, encouraging democracy and
human rights should be used as one (of many) foreign policy
tool to promote and protect American fundamental national
interests on a case by case (or region by region) basis.
A point I would raise in questioning usual definitions of
the national interests of the United States concerns the usual
insistence upon an open international trading system as a
national interest of the United States. Are we going to
isolate (or use military force on) a country if they do not
want to open portions of their agricultural markets? Are not
governments obliged to allow their citizens to be farmers if
that is indeed what they want to do?4
Today, many are questioning just how open an international
trading system can realistically be. Even Adam Smith drew the
line at security, implying that some semblance of an
industrial policy (state intervention) may be required to
ensure the means of production for national
' If the citizens of a nation want their tax dollars to
subsidize farming, instead of using the tax dollars for other
social services, is it not their freedom to choose?
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defense.[Ref. 5] Therefore, an open international
trading system should be stated as one policy of promoting
economic prosperity, not an end.
A fourth problem with the United States' national
interests is assuming America's global leadership role to be
desirable and necessary. While the United States wants to
ensure the global community that it will lead in (or support)
a collective response to t]le world's crises, this pretention
to leadership should be carefully harnessed and reserved for
potential global crisis, such as another Persian Guif war,
unobstructed nuclear weapons proliferation, the collapse of
political and/or economic reforms in Russia, the collapse of
eventual polit..cal and current economic reforms in China's
opening up to the world, or conflicts of interest between two
or more of the major powers.' As one of the major powers in
the international system, the United States will need to
remain engaged to encourage others, and assist when necessary,
in maintaining favorable global and regional balances of power
within the international system. However, the United States,
superpower or not, is not omnipotent nor responsible for (nor
does it have the jurisdiction for) governing the world. In
5 Using the United States power for less than vital
interests or major power conflicts results in half-hearted
interventions that ultimately reduces others perceptions of
the United States power, encourages ambitious rulers to
challenge that power, and causes the United States bureaucracy
to precipitately react to restore bruised egos (so called
credibility), rather than decisively act through careful
analysis and reason.
i1
addition, leadership is not dictating how the international
system will be devised. Leadership is not picking which
national leaders others should support and those they should
not. 6 Leadership is the subtle art of providing guidance and
direction on what needs to be done (while encouraging
feedback) and offering support and/or suggestions when asked,
while allowing presumed followers the freedom to choose the
path they feel most constructive for themselves.'
C. RELEVANCE OF THE PREADMLZ OF THR U.S. CONSTITUTION IN
DETERMINING NATIONAL INTERESTS
In leaving the Cold War paradigm behind, American long-
term national interests should be reassessed and prioritized
to ensure that other defined national interests and objectives
do not encroach upon fundamental interests. To define
fundamental, long-term national interests, and hence their
priority, the preamble of the constitution, a social contract
6 For example, who is the United States to tell Cambodia
that the Khmer Rouge can not participate in their new
government, or that it is alright for Russian leaders to crack
down on civil disobedience but it is not alright for Indonesia
or the Peoples Republic of China.
' When touring the United Nations in June 1993, I was
struck by the recent donation of the people of the United
States to the United Nations. The donation was a mosaic art
design which encompassed pictures of all the ethnicities/
cultures of the world. Indian, Japanese, Chinese, Arab,
American, European, African, Latino, etc. peoples were all
depicted on the art work - and they were all smiling. The
caption on the art design stat.ed "Do unto others as you would
have them do unto you. It would be wise for the United
States to start practicing what it preaches.
12
between the United States government and its people, must be
consulted.[Ref. 6] Specifically,
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a
more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic
Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the
general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to
ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this
Constitution for the United States of America.
(Ref. 71
In examining the Preamble, American fundamental, long-term
national interests can be summed up as follows:
"* Unity of the states.
"* Domestic justice (Equality of all before the law).
"* Domestic tranquility.
"* Defense of Americans.
"* Economic prosperity.
"* Liberty (Freedom to choose without outside interference).
If U.S. policy makers define national interests and objectives
that are something other than what is included in the above
statement, then these new interests should be thoroughly
examined to determine if they encroach on fundamental
interests.[Ref 61 In short, there is no national interest or
objective that is more important that these fundamental
interests. There is no state-sponsored value projection
ideology that represents the United States better than the
transference of American national interests on a global scale
(i.e., United we stand, divided we falter; rule of law;
constructive social development; protection of human beings;
13
progressive economic development; and, uninhibited freedom to
choose).'
Now that fundamental, long-term American national
interests are defined, interests that cross national borders
can be addressed. Unity, justice and tranquility are
essentially domestic interests that can only be vigorously
pursued by Americans themselves. 9 Therefore, the last three
interests, Americans, economic prosperity, and liberty will be
examined within the context of the EA/P region.
' It is also wise to recognize that all other nations
have a similar list of priorities. The art of diplomacy is
reconciling our list with theirs.
' Understandably, as the world continues to get smaller,
these interests will increasingly cross national borders, such
as environmental protection, immigration and refugee policy.
however, these issues will best be solved by fostering
international goodwill.
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III. U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS AND OB3RCTIVZS IN TZ •IA/P
REGION
A. AS DEFZNED IN A STRATEGIC FRAMWZORU FOR TIE ASIAN PACIFIC
RIM (REPORT TO CONGRESS 1992)
The 1992 East Asia strategy report lists United States
security interests in Asia as follows:
"* Protecting the United States and its allies from attack
"* Maintaining regional peace and stability
"* Preserving our political and economic access
"* Contributing to nuclear deterrence
"* Fostering the growth of democracy and human rights
"* Stopping proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons, and ballistic missile systems
"* Ensuring the freedom of navigation
"* Reducing illicit drug trafficking [Ref 2]
B. AS DEFINED IN 1993 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
The 1993 National Security Strategy defines United States
national interests and objectives in the EA/P region as
follows:
"* Maintenance of a strategic framework which reflects the
United States status as a Pacific power and promotes its
engagement in Asia. The key to the United States'
strategic framework has been, and will continue to be, its
alliance with Japan.
"• Expansion of markets through bilateral, regional, and
multilateral arrangements.
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"* Support, contain, or balance the emergence of China onto
the world stage to protect United States national
interests.
"* Through constructive engagement, foster the peaceful
unification process on the Korean peninsula.
"* Encourage the normalization of Indochina and the expansion
and development of the Association of East Asian Nations.
[Ref 31
C. AS DEFINED DURING WINSTON LORD'S CONFIRMATION HEARINGS
Today, no region is the world is more important for the
United States than Asia and the Pacific. Tomorrow, in the
21st century, no region will be as important.
[Ref. 8]
During confirmation hearings for Assistant Secretary of
State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs on March 31, 1993,
Winston Lord designated the following ten major goals, not
listed in any order, for American policy in Asia and the
Pacific:
"* Forging a fresh global partnership with Japan that
reflects a more mature balance of responsibilities;
"* Erasing the nuclear threat and moving toward peaceful
reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula;
"* Restoring firm foundations for cooperation with a China
where political openness catches up with economic reform;
"* Deepening our ties with ASEAN as it broadens its
membership and scope;
"* Obtaining the fullest possible accounting of our missing
in action as we normalize our relations with Vietnam;
"* Securing a peaceful, independent and democratic Cambodia;
"• Strengthening APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) as
the cornerstone of Asian-Pacific economic cooperation;
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"* Developing multilateral forums for security consultations
while maintaining the solid foundations of our alliances;
"* Spurring regional cooperation on global challenges like
the environment, refugees, health, narcotics, non-
proliferation, and arms sales; and
"* Promoting democracy and human rights where freedom has yet
to flower. [Ref 8]
However, while alluding to "enormous stakes in the
Pacific," stating that the "firmest guarantees of America's
staying power in Asia are our overriding national interests,"
and reiterating that America has permanent interests that do
not change every four years, specific United States national
interests are absent from Winston Lord's confirmation
hearings.[Ref 81 Therefore, drawing from national interests
derived from the Preamble of the United States Constitution in
Chapter One, specific national interests in the EA/P region
will be assessed.
D. SPICIFIC NATIONAL INTERESTS IN THE NA/P REGION
Drawing from the above statements and the Preamble of the
Constitution, fundamental, long-term national interests of the
United States in the EA/P region can be summarized as
protection of American lives and property, promoting economic
prosperity, and fostering international goodwill.
1. Protection of American Lives and Property
Over three million Americans currently work and live
abroad who are not directly employed by the American
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government."0 However, Americans living overseas who are not
employed by the United States government have not been
included in any official census since 1970. In that census,
41,791 Americans were accounted for that resided in the EA/P
region, of which 2,652 resided in China, 14,749 resided in
Japan, 1,966 resided in South Korea, 6,317 resided in the
Philippines, 7,234 resided in Vietnam, and 9,053 lived in
other Southeast Asia.[Ref. 9] Nevertheless, these people by
their very existence abroad are supporting American national
interests of economic prosperity and international goodwill.
Put in the context of footsoldiers, Americans abroad live
and work in the trenches of international trade and in so
doing, advance our own economy overseas.[Ref. 10]
As the United States government encourages businesses
to pursue export-oriented growth, the number of Americans
overseas in the EA/P region will continue to increase. These
Americans are well positioned to help the United States
compete in the global business game, imports as well as
exports. In addition, their first hand knowledge with other
cultures provides American companies with important insight
into foreign markets, and if the United States plans to get
ahead in the international economy, it will be encouraging its
10 Valid documentation as to where these three million
civilian Americans reside, by country, was unavailable at the
time of publishing this thesis. A freedom of information
request was required to receive this information from the
Department of State.
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citizens to promote American ideals and products abroad. [Ref
10]
Thus, the United States has an inherent obligation to
look after the safety, prosperity, and liberty of Americans
living abroad. Safety includes the defense of Americans
abroad by ensuring their timely evacuation in a crisis
situation. It is also the obligation of the American
government to see that its citizens g-1 equal protection of
host governments and equal treatment in courts of law. We
want no privileges or no adverse discrimination. Prosperity
includes the ease of Americans pursuing economic relations
abroad without letting governmental political relations hamper
their efforts - i.e., Most Favored Nation trade status and/or
embargoes." Liberty includes cooperative, amiable relations
with foreign governments (to foster international goodwill) so
that Americans abroad get the same protection and the same
privileges as anyone else, no more or less, and the same goes
for foreigners in the United States. [Ref 4]
In addition to civilian Americans living overseas, the
United States Department of Defense currently has over 200,000
personnel living abroad in the EA/P region to promote and
protest ,American interests. [Ref. 111 Table 1 breaks down
where these persons reside.
1 George Washington's Farewell Address warned that "the
great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign Nations,
is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them
as little political connection as possible."
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TABLE 1
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PERSONNEL IN EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC(AS OF MARCH 31, 1993)
COUNTRY TOTAL MILITARY CIVILIAN DEPENDENT
AUSTRALIA 987 393 43 551
BURMA 21 10 0 11
CAMBODIA 8 7 1 0
CHINA 58 31 0 27
FIJI 6 2 0 4
HONG KONG 74 31 0 43
INDONESIA 176 50 91 35
JAPAN 119,948 46,948 22,400 50,600
S. KOREA 60,788 35,946 13,707 11,135
LAOS 5 5 0 0
MALAYSIA 73 25 7 41
NEW ZEALAND 120 61 8 51
PHILIPPINES 369 114 93 162
SINGAPORE 359 156 28 175
THAILAND 372 115 168 89
VIETNAM 4 3 1 0
AFLOAT 21,066 21,066 0 0
TOTAL 204,434 104,963 36,547 62,924
Source: Department of Defense, Worldwide Manpower
Distribution By Geographic Area.
Since the United States government stations civilian
and military personnel abroad, it has an inherent obligation
to look after their protection and welfare. Thus we have
special status of forces agreements. Military personnel must
be granted the flexibility and mobility to protect themselves
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along with civilian counterparts and dependents, if the need
arises. As was seen in the Philippines, anti-Americanism can
quickly become a rallying point'2  for less than altruistic
politicians, and cause uneducated/uninformed populace to
strike out against American personnel." With nationalism on
the rise in Asia, the wisdom of keeping a permanent United
States military presence on foreign soil, without the
flexibility or mobility to defend themselves and others (so
they can decisively act instead of precipitously react), will
increasingly be called into question.
The United States government is also responsible for
the common defense of its foreign service officers, peace
corps and diplomatic corps. If an unfavorable crisis arises,
and other vital interests are not at risk, means (policies and
plans) must be available to evacuate diplomatic personnel (in
conjunction with civilian personnel) from foreign soil or
otherwise provide for their safety.
"2 This rallying point is usually used to create a sense
of victimology so governments can remain in obsessive denial
of their own problems, shortcomings and character defaults.
"n Five American military personnel were slain in the





United States global two-way trade" with the EA/P
region (see Appendix A) surpassed two-way trade with Western
Europe in 1976. While two-way trade with Western Europe has
remained relatively constant since 1978, two-way trade with
the EA/P region has continued to grow. In 1992, 36 percent of
the United States global two-way trade was with the EA/P
region, while 23 percent was with Western Europe, and 34
percent was within the Western Hemisphere.
In addition, over 39 percent of the United States
two-way trade is now with developing nations. In 1992, the
EA/P region accounted for over 51 percent of this trade,
followed by 38 percent with the Western Hemisphere, 10 percent
with the Middle East, 6 percent with Africa, and 3 percent
with the former Warsaw Pact states.
Within the EA/P region (see Appendix B), United
States two-way trade*"S with Japan has declined from a high of
54 percent in 1972 to 41 percent in 1992. Two-way trade* with
Australia and New Zealand has also declined from a high of 9
"14 All trade data was obtained from the Direction of Trade
Statistics Yearbook published by the International Monetary
Fund.
15 An * following two-way trade means that this trade is
accounted for as a percentage of total two-way trade between
the United States and Asia.
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of 9 percent and 3 percent, respectively, in 1966 to 4 percent
and 1 percent, respectively, in 1992.
On the other hand, United States two-way trade*
with Greater China (mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong),
has increased from 8 percent in 1966 to 26 percent in 1992.
United States two-way trade* has also increased with South
Korea from 4 percent in 1966 to 9 percent in 1992,16 and with
the Southeast Asian sub-region from 15 percent in 1966 to 17
percent in 1992."?
b. Exports
The Commerce Department states that since 1987, 55
percent of the growth of the United States gross domestic
product (GDP) has come from United States exports.
[Ref. 12] The National Export Strategy, recently
unveiled by Commerce Secretary Ron Brown, is expected to lead
the way toward sustained U.S. growth, economic security and
job creation. [Ref 12] Therefore, to support the economic
renewal of the United States' domestic economy, the United
States government will be relying increasingly on expanding
markets for United States exports.
United States global exports (see Appendix C) to
Asia equalled exports to Europe in 1984 at 25 percent.
16 The high of two-way trade* with South Korea was in 1988
at 11 percent.
"' The high of two-way trade* with Southeast Asia was 20
percent in 1980.
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Looking at United States global exports in a dynamic context,
though, exports to Asia have increased from 22 percent in 1966
to 29 percent in 1992 while exports to Europe have declined
from 32 percent in 1966 to 25 percent in 1992. Exports to
countries within the Western Hemisphere have remained
relatively static at 37-38 percent from 1966 to 1992. In
addition, over 30 percent of United States exports are now
going to developing countries. The brunt of these exports are
going to Western hemisphere countries (42 percent in 1992
which is down from 47% in 1966) and EA/P region countries (41
percent in 1992 which is up from 34 percent in 1966).
Looking at United States exports*1 8 to the EA/P
region (see Appendix D), 36 percent of United States exports
went to Japan in 1966. These exports* increased to 48 percent
in 1972 but, have steadily declined since back to 36 percent
in 1992. In addition, United States exports* to Australia and
New Zealand have decreased from a high of 10 percent and 2
percent, respectively, in 1966 to 7 percent and 1 percent,
respectively, in 1992.
On the other hand, United States exports* to the
EA/P region have been steadily increasing to Greater China (7
percent in 1966 to 24 percent in 1992). This increase is also
evident in United States exports* to South Korea (5 percent in
18 An * following exports means that this trade is
accounted for as a percentage of total exports between the
United States and the EA/P region.
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1966 to 11 percent in 1992) and to countries in the Southeast
Asian sub-region (15 percent in 1966 to 18 percent in 1992).
c. Importz
While the value of imports is frequently
overlooked, imports provide jobs (receiving terminals,
distributors, warehousing, etc), provide competition for
United States companies, and provide consumers with cheaper
prices. Therefore, to support American economic renewal,
increased competition, and the shift to high-value
manufacturing, the United States will continue to import goods
to provide Americans the best value for their dollars.
United States global imports (see Appendix E) from
Asia equalled imports from Europe in 1972 at 28 percent.
Looking at United States global imports in a dynamic context,
though, imports from Asia have increased from 21 percent in
1966 to 42 percent in 1992 while imports from Europe have
declined from 31 percent in 1968 to 21 percent in 1992.
Imports to the United States from within the Western
Hemisphere have also declined from a high of 43 percent in
1968 to 31 percent in 1992. In addition, over 40 percent of
United States imports are now coming from developing
countries. The brunt of these imports are coming from the
EA/P region (54 percent in 1992 which is up from 25 percent in
1966) and the Western Hemisphere (31 percent in 1992 which is
down significantly from 61 percent in 1966).
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Looking at United States imports*1 9 from the EA/P
region (see Appendix F), Japan comprised 43 percent of the
market in 1992 (which is down from a high of 59 percent in
1972). In addition, United States imports* from Australia and
New Zealand have decreased from a high of 7 percent and 3
percent, respectively, in 1966 to 2 percent and 1 percent,
respectively, in 1992.
On the other hand, United States imports* from the
EA/P region have been steadily increasing from Greater China
(10 percent in 1966 to 27 percent in 1992) and from South
Korea (2 percent in 1966 to 8 percent in 1992). United States
imports* from the countries in the Southeast Asian sub-region
have remained relatively static from 1966 to 1992 at 16
percent.
d. Investments
United States global direct investment abroad21
(see Appendix G) is substantially higher in Europe than in
Asia, initially due to the Marshall Plan, later due to the
ease of capital transfer following the integration of the
European Community. In 1992, 49 percent of total direct
investment abroad was in Europe, while 32 percent was in the
" An * following imports means that this trade is
accounted for as a percentage of total imports between the
United States and the EA/P region.
"20 All direct investment abroad data was obtained from the
Survey of Current Business published by the United States
Department of Commerce.
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Western Hemisphere and 16 percent was in Asia. In numbers,
1992 United States direct investment position abroad amounts
to over $239 billion in Europe, over $157 billion in the
Western Hemisphere, and over $78 billion in Asia. However,
average annual rate of return on investment from 1987-1991 was
highest in Asia, at 16.6 percent, followed by 14 percent in
Europe, and 10.5 percent in the Western Hemisphere.
In addition, over 27 percent of United States
direct investment abroad is now in developing countries. The
majority of developing country investment is in countries in
the Western Hemisphere (67 percent in 1992 which is down from
80 percent in 1966) and in countries in the EA/P region (24
percent in 1992 which is up from 12 percent in 1966).
The United States direct investment position abroad
in the EA/P region in 1992 was over $78 billion (see Appendix
H). Table 2 breaks out this investment by industry. One
third of United States direct investment abroad in the EA/P
region is in Japan. Other investment includes $2.7 billion in
South Korea, $11.8 billion in Greater China, $16.6 billion in
Australia, $3.0 billion in New Zealand, and $16.7 billion in
Southeast Asian countries.
The average annual rate of return on direct
investment abroad from 1987-1991, however, is highest for
Southeast Asian countries at 26.5 percent, followed by 20.3
percent for Greater China, 12.0 percent for Australia, 11.2
27
percent for Japan, 10.2 percent for South Korea, and 7.8
percent for New Zealand.
TABLE 2
1992 UNITED STATES DIRECT INVESTMENT POSITION ABROAD IN
THE EA/P REGION BY INDUSTRY









Source: United States Department of Commerce, Survey
of Current Business.
e. Jobs
According to the U.S. Commerce Department, every $1
billion of exports supports about 20,000 jobs.
[Ref. 13] In addition, export-related jobs pay 17
percent more than the average United States job.[Ref 12]
In 1992, United States global exports employed over
8.9 million Americans. Of these 8.9 million American jobs,
3.32 million are supported by exports to the Western
Hemisphere, 2.64 million are supported by exports to the EA/P
region, and 2.28 million are supported by exports to Western
Europe.
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Within the EA/P region, United States exports have
doubled since 1986. This doubling of exports increased the
employment of Americans from 1.25 million jobs, just six years
ago, to 2.64 million American jobs in 1992. Employment
provided to Americans from exports to Japan, Greater China,
Southeast Asian countries, South Korea, Australia, and New
Zealand total over 955,000, 634,800, 479,840, 292,600,
178,260, and 26, 140, respectively. In the past six years, the
rate of increase in jobs from exports to Japan, Greater China,
Southeast Asian countries, South Korea, Australia and New
Zealand were 177 percent, 272 percent, 278 percent, 230
percent, 160 percent and 148 percent, respectively.
3. Internntional Goodwill
observe good faith and justice towards all nations.
Cultivate peace and harmony with all.[Ref. 141
To secure the blessings of liberty for ourselves and
our posterity, America needs constructive, open relations with
all nations that prosper in goodwill .21 During the Cold War,
the United States diplomatic and military corps provided the
bulk of goodwill to friends and allies by promoting peace and
freedom abroad.
21 While freedoms are guaranteed in the Bill of Rights,
it must be remembered that America was built on brotherhood,
the belief that all men should act brotherly toward one
another, regardless of differences in race, creed,
nationality, etc. If we can not respect one another,
guaranteed rights quickly encroach upon one another - witness
America today.
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However, in leaving the Cold War paradigm behind, this
goodwill must be expanded to include more than friends and
allies that sided with the United States during the Cold War.
While maintenance of these friendships may be desirable,
goodwill is also desired from those who have now seen the
fallacy of previous ways (former Warsaw Pact) and those
striving for modernization" and peaceful coexistence (non-
aligned). Healthy and cooperative relations with other
governments help to advance common interests, increase mutual
understanding, and provide direction and feedback in trying to
make sense out of a dynamic, perplexing world. Some examples
of promoting international goodwill include: scientific and
technical exchanges, the United States peace corps, missionary
efforts, famine relief assistance, sponsoring diplomatic
negotiations for the peaceful resolution of disputes, and
encouraging student exchanges through the United States
Information Agency.
In the upheaval taking place in international
relations today, we must remember that interests are
permanent, allies and enemies are not. There is no telling
who tomorrow's friends and foes will be. It would be prudent
policy not to point any fingers or burn any bridges for short-
term political capital without thinking through the long-term
political ramifications.
22 Modernization does not necessarily mean Westernization.
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Clearly, the United States has significant, long-term
national interests in the EA/P region. In addition, United
States interests in the EA/P region have been growing faster
than in other regions of the world. However, with the
withdrawal of United States military forces from facilities in
the Republic of the Philippines, is the Southeast Asian sub-
region still important to the United States? What percentage
of EA/P region interests lie within the sub-region of
Southeast Asia? Where will Southeast Asia fall in regards to
United States military and security policy in the Post-cold
war era? These are the questions that must be addressed in
formulating our future policies towards the entire EA/P region
and its Southeast Asian component.
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IV. TER SOUTIMAST ASIAN SUB-RZGION
A. BACKROUND
Southeast Asia is a region of remarkable diversity,
consisting of the mainland Southeast Asian states of Vietnam,
Cambodia, Laos, Burma and Thailand, and insular Southeast Asia
consisting of Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Brunei, and the
Philippines. This region has been a cultural and trade
crossroads for centuries between the east and west. Except
for geographic proximity and a tropical ecology, few
characteristics link these diverse states into a coherent
whole. [Ref. 15)
Nevertheless, most Southeast Asian countries share certain
patterns: a colonial past; a postwar struggle for
independence and modernization; religious penetration by
Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Christianity; agricultural
economies that have been overtaken by manufacturing in the
past decade; reliance on patron-client bonds for achieving
goals; and a strong sense of the village as the primary unit
of identity. [Ref 151
When the twentieth century opened, England controlled
Burma, Malaya (now Malaysia and Singapore), and parts of
Borneo (including Brunei); France was supreme in Indochina
(Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia); and, Thailand preserved her
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independence between the French and British possessions by
playing each of the great powers off against the other. The
Netherlands held most of the East Indies (Indonesia) while the
United States governed the Philippines. Between 1900 and
1941, all these areas, whether colonial or not, displayed
certain similarities (with remarkable differences) in their
historical development. Governments adopted policies which
the West considered to be increasingly enlightened in order to
cope with the rising tide of nationalism. Economic issues
became as bitter as political issues in the struggle between
rulers and ruled.
Social and cultural changes kept in sync with politics and
economics. The usual conflict existed between those who clung
to the old ways (rural villages) and those who yearned for the
progress the twentieth century was to provide, primarily in
the cities. Cultural movements were helpful and harmful from
a political point of view. While religion, education, art and
literature were called upon to establish a national identity
as in Cambodia or Indonesia, other instances of cultural
revival only intensified the elements of diversity, as in
Burma or Malaya. Southeast Asia was near the end of the
colonial era when the Japanese unleashed their attack in 1941.
Following the Second World War, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia,
Burma and Indonesia took advantage of hostilities to wrest
their independence from their former colonial masters. The
same happened in the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, and
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Brunei. With the receipt of their newly found independence,
each country began to develop its state in its own ways.
Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines
chose semi-democratic" forms of government for political
development, while Burma hung to a military authoritarian
government and Brunei retained its absolute monarchy.
Sporadically, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos followed the
communist authoritarian model for government.[Ref 15]
When the Cold War began to spill over into Southeast Asia,
a division soon became apparent. The non-communist, open
societies of Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Brunei,
and the Philippines became one bloc, while Vietnam leaned
toward communism. Burma remained neutral and isolated its
country from the internal happenings of Southeast Asia.
Indonesia, Cambodia and Laos joined Burma as a leading light
of the non-aligned combination.
The fragileness of each of the Southeast Asian countries
should not be underestimated. The potential for civil war
and/or civil disobedience must constantly be monitored, and
how the Southeast Asian leadership handles the distribution
between the economic haves and have nots will continue to
determine their own survivability in the future. At the same
2' Neher defines semi-democratic as those nations with a
semblance of citizen involvement in choosing governmental
leaders, the executive leader not fully accountable to the
legislative branch, a high degree of civil liberties - with
some exceptions - to ensure "law and order" and autonomous
groups representing the interests of the people.
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time, the countries of Southeast Asia are moving in the
direction of greater national resilience and self-reliance.
Their prospects rest on each country's internal capacity to
meet the needs of its people and to assure them a higher
standard of living. Each nation must strike its own bargain
between requirements for growth and stability, authority and
freedom, regional interdependence and nationalism, and
modernization and cultural integrity.[Ref 15]
While there is considerable diversity in the makeup of the
individual Southeast Asian countries, Lucian Pye provides
evidence that there is a common outlook for the countries in
Asia. Specifically,
Conventional wisdom, holding that at times it is
appropriate to minimize Europe's diversities and
concentrate on its common heritage, judges Asia's
differences to be unmanageable. Comparisons within Europe
are thus considered justifiable, while attempts to compare
Asian countries are like 'comparing apples and oranges.'
If we reflect on those comparisons within Asia which come
most naturally, it soon becomes apparent that they share
one quality: it is not that they are variations on a
common past, as with the countries of Europe, but rather
that they share similar hopes for the future. The common
element in Asia is that it is a continent in pursuit of
economic growth, national power, and all that can be
lumped together under the general label of modernization.
The unity of Europe lies in its history; the unity of Asia
is in the more subtle, but no less real, shared
consciousness of the desirability of change and of making
a future different from the past.[Ref. 16]
This common outlook is most prevalent in an analysis of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
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B. TRH ASSOCIATION OF SOUTMNA8T ASIAN NATIONS
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is
frequently cited as a shining example of regional cooperation.
Comprised of the free-market, non-communist states of the
Southeast Asian sub-region - Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore,
Thailand, and the Philippines, with the addition of Brunei in
1984 - ASEAN was established in 1967.24
ASEAN's publicly stated primary objective was to foster
intra-ASEAN economic, social, and cultural cooperation. Still
suffering from internal fragmentation as newly independent
states, though, the member countries were clearly aware of the
need for enhanced security cooperation against internal
communist insurgency for the sake of regime stability.2" They
were inherently hostile towards any possible aggression from
the outside, as they were as suspicious of the Americans as
they had previously been of the Europeans. Therefore, a
closer examination of ASEAN's performance over the past 25
years indicates that ASEAN has been far more successful in the
diplomatic and political arena than on the economic
cooperation front. [Ref. 17] In fact, the ASEAN experience
strongly suggests that the commitment of the member states to
the continued maintenance of ASEAN has less to do with its
24 Earlier attempts at coordination failed. It was only
the uncertainties of the United States-Vietnam war that
brought Asians together.
"25 ASEAN members had widely accepted the then prevalent
domino theory.
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economic role and more in its utility as a diplomatic and
political tool.[Ref 17]
Initial ASEAN security perceptions were based on Cold War
realities that for Thailand, the Philippines and Singapore
included a reliance upon a United States military presence in
the region. The non-aligned countries of Malaysia and
Indonesia, however, formulated a basis for decoupling the
region from superpower rivalry: the Zone of Peace, Freedom,
and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in the Kuala Lumpur declaration of
November 1971. (Ref. 181 ZOPFAN signified an aspiration that
gave expression to Indonesian and Malaysian desire to remove
superpower military presence from Southeast Asia. The
compromise that was achieved between these two viewpoints
involved an acceptance of ZOPFAN as the higher plane of ASEAN
toward which the organization should evolve, while reaffirming
the temporary role of the United States military presence in
the Philippines and Thailand.[Ref 18]
After the United States withdrawal from Vietnam, ASEAN
members went on a military-hardware buying spree, mostly
purchased from Uncle Sam, and closer collaboration was
initiated among ASEAN members in political as well as economic
and social matters (deja vu). The ASEAN countries developed
a somewhat united political front against Vietnamese hegemony
in Indochina in 1976, with Thailand being designated as the
front-line state for the security of ASEAN. However, fearing
that ASEAN would be seen by its neighbors as a replacement for
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the now defunct Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO),
the countries limited themselves to bi- or multi-lateral
border security cooperation by some members of ASEAN, and
refused to turn the association into a defense
pact.[Ref. 19)
In addition, the first ASEAN Summit in Bali in 1976
affirmed a commitment to regional order based on the
territorial status quo which was enshrined in the Treaty of
Amity and Cooperation. This treaty was in direct response to
the devastation previously wrought by Indonesia's campaign
against Malaysia (1963-66), which exposed the dangers of
territorial revisionism and the need for common affirmation of
the post-colonial frontiers.[Ref 18] Moreover, the fear of
communist insurgency, especially with the withdrawal of the
United States military from Vietnam on less than favorable
terms, prompted Southeast Asian leaders to coordinate
political responses against communism in general. [Ref 18] In
their relations with one another, the signatories to the
Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in Southeast Asia were to be
guided by the following fundamental principles:
"* Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty,
equality, territorial integrity and national identity of
all nations;
"* The right of every state to lead its national existence
free from external interference, subversion or coercion;
"* Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another;
"• Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means;
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* Renunciation of the threat or use of force; and
- Effective cooperation among themselves.[Ref. 20]
Vietnam's invasion and subsequent occupation of Cambodia
(December 1978-September 1989) was the test of ASEAN's
commitment to regional order, and its success in terms of
focusing the international community's attention upon a
territorial revision by force or arms endowed ASEAN with a
unique sense of status. [Ref 18] Due to the Cambodian invasion
and the subsequent movement of Soviet maritime forces into Cam
Ran Bay, regular meetings of ASEAN foreign ministers and
senior officials were initiated which forged common diplomatic
positions over the Cambodian conflict as well as economic
relations with major trading partners such as the United
States, Japan, and the European Community. Until 1989 ASEAN
leaned entirely towards the side of the non-communist world.
Fearing an indefinite postponement of ZOPFAN as a result
of the stalemate in Cambodia and intensifying great power
rivalry in Southeast Asia, the ASEAN foreign ministers revived
the Working Group on ZOPFAN in 1984.[Ref. 21] The following
year they directed it to develop a detailed elaboration of the
principles, objectives and elements of a nuclear weapons-free
zone in Southeast Asia (SEANWFZ), which was advanced as a
component of ZOPFAN. The ASEAN heads of government meeting,
at their third summit in Manila in December 1987, directed the
Working Group to work towards the early realization of ZOPFAN
and a SEANWFZ.[Ref 21]
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Vietnam's withdrawal from Cambodia in 1989 was an
indication that Vietnam recognized that the principle of
territorial status quo, which had governed relations between
the ASEAN countries, extended to Indochina as well. 2 ' [Ref 18]
The extension of this principle to a communist-dominated part
of the region, which previously had been a source of
instability, was a major achievement. However, with the
removal of the Cambodian conflict as a fundamental threat to
the organization, the cohesion and shape of ASEAN and
Southeast Asian regionalism began to be altered.
Fundamentally, Indonesia and Malaysia wish to embrace
Indochina to strengthen ASEAN's collective shield against
China. Thailand and Singapore regard Indochina in terms of
its business and commercial potential and an opportunity to
develop trade and economic ties. Therefore, in 1991,
Malaysian Premier Mahatir publicly supported the integration
of all Indochina countries as well as Myanmar into ASEAN and
has called for ASEAN dialogue with Vietnamese, Laotian, and
Myanmar representatives. 2" [Ref 18] The admission of
Indochinese states and Burma would bring to an end ASEAN's
commitment to anti-communism.
26 This can also be viewed in light of the disintegration
of the Warsaw Pact, and Vietnam's loss of external client
political and monetary support.
27 Dialogue with Cambodian representatives was put on hold
due to the UNTAC mission.
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In return, Vietnam and Laos, once hostile to ASEAN's
regionalism, began to campaign for their own acceptance by the
regional organization. At the ASEAN Foreign Ministers
Conference in Manila in July 1992, Vietnam and Laos both
acceded to the Bali Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and gained
observer status, following Papua New Guinea's path in 1989.
Nevertheless, Indochina's total absorption into the mainstream
of Southeast Asia regionalism, as exemplified by ASEAN, will
require time. The Vietnamese and Laotian economies are
products of central planning and their economic retardation
contrasts markedly with the vigorous growth of the ASEAN open
market economies. In addition, full membership into ASEAN
will only follow at a later stage and depend upon the ability
of these countries to transform their economies and to forge
closer political and economic links with the ASEAN
members.[Ref 18]
The issue of Myanmar's accession has been raised only as
a matter of principle but not practical policy while the State
Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) remains in power in
that country.[Ref 18] On the other har.d, Cambodia was
included as a special guest at the ASEAN PMC meeting in July
1993. This was due to the relative success of the United
Nations' peacekeeping mission and formal elections in May
1993. ASEAN is currently deliberating on whether or not the
regional grouping should take up the financial role (of the
U.N. mission) in sharing the burden of peacekeeping and peace
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building in Cambodia as the United Nations pulls
out.[Ref. 221
ASEAN is also attempting to rise to the challenge
presented by the Post-Cold War security environment while
maintaining its relevancy to provide members with the enhanced
benefits of collective political and security support. jRef 181
Security concerns stretch beyond the Southeast Asian region
and involve the behavior and intentions of regional powers
such as China and Japan and, to a lesser extent, India. In
particular, the withdrawal of the United States military
presence from facilities in the Philippines in 1992 removed an
important security prop for ASEAN. Therefore, the
organization has been initiating compensating security
adjustments.[Ref 18]
One such adjustment was the ASEAN countries proposal to
convert the Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) into a security
forum called the ASEAN Regional Forum. 28 This proposal was an
alternative to the idea of creating a ne., forum, which was
rejected due to fears that a new entity would overshadow ASEAN
and quickly become a convenience for external powers.[Ref 181
Along with this security forum expansion came the inclusion of
China, Laos, Papua New Guinea, Russia and Vietnam to meet
28 The ASEAN PMC was previously a vehicle for the
discussion of trade and economic issues with seven dialogue
partners (the United States, Japan, the European Community,
Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and since 1991, South Korea)
on a bilateral basis.
42
ASEAN and its dialogue partners at the ASEAN Regional Forum in
Bangkok in 1994.[Ref. 23] While ASEAN diplomats
expected some resistance from their dialogue partners due to
the inclusion of China and Russia, only Japan, so far, has
maintained reservations.(Ref. 24] It is to America's
interests to follow closely this evolution of ASEAN into one
of the major players in EA/P diplomacy.
C. HISTORICAL NATIONAL INTERESTS IN THE PHILIPPINES AND
SOUTHEAST ASIA
United States national interests in the Republic of the
Philippines, the heart of Southeast Asia, have varied at
different periods of time. Initially, the Philippines was
used by the United States to gain clout as an emerging global
power. Prior to World War II, the Philippines was used as a
strategic location for entry into the China market, coaling
and military power projection. After World War II, the
Philippines was used as a forward basing platform for the
containment of the Soviet Union. Southeast Asia was seen as
a strategic region of contest for the ambitions of the great
powers.
When Admiral Dewey defeated the Spanish Fleet at Manila
Bay in 1898, the McKinley administration decided to annex the
Philippines so that the United States could gain clout as an
emerging global power at par with the French, British, Dutch,
and Russians. However, unlike the other colonists, the United
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States proclaimed only altruistic motivations for annexing the
Philippines. The United States would not exploit the
Philippines, only train them for self-government. In short,
the Philippines was to be a showcase for American democracy,
an example for the other colonial nations to emulate.
[Ref. 251
However, in emphasizing the value of the Philippines
strategic location as a coaling station on the way to the
Chinese market and as a base for American military power in
the Western Pacific, American expansionists continued to win
domestic debates against American isolationists on the future
status of the Philippines. Therefore, the Philippines was
retained as a colony of the United States and the United
States became involved, for the first time, with conflicts of
interest between Russia, Japan and the Western maritime
powers.
In supporting annexation, Homer Lea, an expansionist
school strategist of the period, argued that a United States
military presence in the Western Pacific, particularly in
Southeast Asia, was critical in putting together a forward
defense against what he anticipated were growing threats to
United States interests in the region.[Ref. 261 Lea
conceived Japanese capabilities, both industrial and military,
as potential threats to the United States and saw U.S.
expansion across the Pacific, from Hawaii to the Philippines,
following a trajectory that would inevitably bring it into
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contact with Japanese forces. Therefore, unless the United
States obstructed those islands, the Japanese would seize the
islands for staging and support facilities.[Ref 26] Lea
further saw that the Japanese would have to plan a major
conflict with the United States if Japan did not intend to
remain a secondary power in East Asia and the Western Pacific
and that conquest of the Philippine archipelago would give
Tokyo control over the major trade routes and critical
maritime choke points in the area (namely Luzon strait).[Ref
26] In 1916, on the eve of American entry into World War I,
the Philippines was promised independence as soon as a stable
government could be established therein.
At the outbreak of World War II, the Filipinos became a
fighting ally of the United States. The Hukbalahap worked
with and independently of the Americans in the hillsides in
guerilla warfare during the Japanese occupation. Pledging to
return, MacArthur fought his way back to the Philippines. As
promised, the Filipinos were given their independence on July
4, 1946.
The devastation of Europe and much of Asia during World
War II allowed the United States to emerge as a superpower
after the war. An expansionist policy-driven America entered
on a direct collision course with Stalin's expansionist
policy-driven Soviet Union. Secretary of State Dean Acheson
declared that American vital interests in the Far East were
based on the islands off the Asian mainland: Japan, the
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Philippines, and Australia. Accordingly, the fundamental
strategic task was to make sure that no serious amphibious
force could ever be assembled and dispatched from an Asiatic
port.[Ref. 271 This assertion was given credibility by
General MacArthur's previous declaration of describing the
area of the Pacific in which it was necessary for the United
States to have a striking force as a U-shaped area embracing
the Midway islands, the former Japanese mandated islands,
Clark Field in the Philippines, and above all Okinawa.
Therefore, to preserve its image as a Pacific power and to
promote and protect its interests in Asia against the Soviet
Union, the Philippines became a vital world order interest for
the United States as its forward outpost in the Pacific. [Ref
251
Due to the nature of evolving international politics at
the end of the Second World War, the United States felt called
upon to pick up the pieces as the old European colonial
empires in Southeast Asia were dissolved. American
involvement in Southeast Asia initially ranged from political
support for Indonesians fighting the Dutch for independence to
the maintenance of a neo-colonial grasp on the Philippines.
Determined to prevent a repetition of history (that prewar
isolationism had been a cause of many of the variables that
subsequently afflicted mankind), the United States assumed the
imperial burdens of maintaining peace and stability in
Southeast Asia.[Ref 28]
46
With the rise of Communist rule in China in 1949,
Washington moved uncertainly toward a policy of partial
disengagement in the Far East due to the Sino-Soviet alliance.
With the outbreak of hostilities in Korea in June 1950,
however, Asia became the main theater of Cold War operations.
With the eruption of hostilities in Korea, Vietnam came to
be regarded as the second front of a larger struggle to check
Communist expansion.[Ref 28] When Chinese troops joined the
North Koreans, Washington began funneling military equipment
and supplies to the French in Indochina. However, the French
debacle in 1954 (first Indochina War) prompted the United
States to attempt the construction of a new defense perimeter
to block any further advance by the Communists.[Ref 28] This
included the negotiation of the Southeast Asia Collective
Defense Treaty, the establishment of the Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization (SEATO), and efforts to build a militarily viable
state in South Vietnam.
However, SLATO was doomed to impotence from the start.
[Ref. 28] Membership of SEATO included Britain, New Zealand,
Australia, France, Pakistan, the United States, but only two
of the Southeast Asian states, namely Thailand and the
Philippines. The collective responsibility of participants in
the organization was essentially restricted to blocking the
open invasion of the region by any communist power that might
be prompted to fight in the traditional manner rather than
wage irregular warfare.[Ref 28] Thanks partly to its
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diplomacy, the United States was able to pump vitality into
South Vietnam for another ten years.
During the ensuing civil war in Vietnam, the United States
was unable to continue to prop up an autocratic, illegitimate
Ngo Dinh Diem. In accordance with the domino theory (simply
an expression of the belief that some physical law dictates
domination of the small by the mighty) [Ref 28], President
Johnson used the Tonkin Gulf Resolution to declare all of
Southeast Asia to be a vital defense interest of the United
States. As such, the second Indochina war came into being as
President Johnson was given the authority for military
intervention in Vietnam.2 9
Due to America's Vietnam debacle, the newly elected
President Nixon issued America's new foreign policy doctrine
from Guam in 1969.30 Its most pressing purpose was to
announce that the United States would never again become
heavily involved with manpower in attempting to solve Asia's
problems.[Ref. 29) Specifically, the Nixon Doctrine embraced
three basic precepts:
"• The United States will keep all its treaty commitments.
"* We shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the
freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose
29 The first Civil War in Vietnam was that between France
and the Vietminh which raged from 1946 to 1954.
30 Williams describes the Nixon Doctrine as the
restoration of Truman's previous partial disengagement policy
in Asia.
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survival we consider vital to our security and the
security of the region as a whole.
* In cases involving other types of aggression, we shall
furnish military and economic assistance when requested as
appropriate. But we shall look to the nation directly
threatened to assume the primary responsibility of
providing the manpower for its defense. [Ref 29]
Claude Buss provides a concise analysis of the Nixon
Doctrine, as follows:
By way of elaboration of the Nixon Doctrine, various
spokesmen for the administration explained that the United
States would remain strong in the Pacific as an
encouragement to its friends and a deterrent to war, but
would no longer immerse itself in the internal affairs of
others. The United States would support nationalism,
economic development and modernization in accordance with
its interests and commitments. It would not turn its back
on any nation of the region but would avoid the creation
of situations in which there might be such dependency on
the United States as to enmesh the United States
inevitably in what were essentially Asian conflicts and
problems. The United States wished to extend assistance
to the greatest extent possible but in an orderly and
judicious manner; it wished to participate as one Pacific
nation among several in economic development and the
maintenance of stability in Asia. [Ref. 30]
With the onset of Watergate, however, President Ford was
left to deal with the implementation of Nixon's Doctrine.
After the United States withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975,
further clarification of the Nixon Doctrine was given.
America would help only those who would help themselves,
for there would have to be 'shared burdens and shared
responsibilities.,'... 'America will no longer try to play
policeman to the world. Instead, we will expect other
nations to provide more cops on the beat in their own
neighborhood.'[Ref 29]
Wavering between whether the United States should pull out
completely from Southeast Asia and the Philippine bases and
lose creditability or maintain some form of the status quo,
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President Ford and Carter chose to maintain the status quo.
They could do no less in the Cold War environment.
During the Reagan and Bush administrations, as the Cold
War heated up between the United States and the "evil empire,"
the Philippines assumed a new importance as a vital operating
base in Southeast Asia. This was due to the strategic
location of the Philippines, the long political association of
the United States and the Philippines, and the availability of
two key United States naval and air force bases.
However, with the cooling down of U.S.-U.S.S.R. arguments,
the withdrawal of United States military forces from the
Philippines, and the current state of the art of war and
weaponry, the credibility of the Philippines as a vital world
order interest for the United States is no longer an issue.
In addition, with the opening of China and the collapse of the
Soviet Union, the strategic significance of Southeast Asia to
the United States has declined immeasurably. (Ref 21] However,
unlike Russia, the United States continues to have
considerable economic and political interests in the Southeast
Asian sub-region.
D. SPECXFXC NATIONAL INTElESTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
In leaving the Cold War paradigm behind, American long-
term national interests in Southeast Asia should be reassessed
and prioritized. Again, the protection of American lives and
property, economic prosperity, and the promotion and fostering
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of international goodwill, will be examined as primary
interests in the Southeast Asian sub-region.
1. Protection of American Livem and Property
Over 1,300 American Department of Defense military and
civilian personnel (and their dependents) currently work and
live abroad in Southeast Asia to promote and protect United
States national interests (see Table 3). These people are
supporting American national interests of security by
conducting military to military relations abroad.
TABLE 3
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PERSONNEL IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
(AS OF MARCH 31, 1993)
COUNTRY TOTAL MILITARY CIVILIAN DEPENDENT
BURMA 21 10 0 11
CAMBODIA 8 7 1 0
INDONESIA 176 50 91 35
LAOS 5 5 0 0
MALAYSIA 73 25 7 41
PHILIPPINES 369 114 93 162
SINGAPORE 359 156 28 175
THAILAND 372 115 168 89
VIETNAM 4 3 1 0
TOTAL 1387 485 389 513
Source: Department of Defense, Worldwide Manpower
Distribution by Geographic Area.
In addition, the 1970 census conducted by the United
States Census Bureau estimated that 22,604 American personnel
reside within the Southeast Asian sub-region that are not
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employed by the United States government. These people are
supporting the other American national interests of economic




Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and
Indonesia were among the top 30 partners in total United
States trade in 1991.[Ref. 31] Of the United States
two-way trade with the EA/P region in 1992, 17 percent was
with countries within the Southeast Asian sub-region. This
percentage is up from 15 percent in 1966, but down from a high
of 20 percent in 1980. Table 4 depicts the numerical value of
two-way trade with the Southeast Asian sub-region. Table 5
depicts the composition of two-way trade between the United
States and the Southeast Asian sub-region (since United States
trade with Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, and Brunei is less
than 1 percent of EA/P trade, the composition of that trade is
not discussed in standard sources).
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TABLE 4
UNITED STATES TWO-WAY TRADE WITH SOUTHEAST ASIA
(IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
COUNTRY 1966 RANK 1992 RANK % OF
TOTAL TOTAL EA/P
TRADE
BURMA 27 7 47 7 < 1
CAMBODIA 3 9 16 8 < 1
LAOS 10 8 7 9 < 1
VIETNAM 314 2 5 10 < 1
BRUNEI 0 10 483 6 < 1
INDONESIA 239 3 7482 4 2
MALAYSIA 223 4 12936 2 3.5
PHILIPPINES 746 1 7376 5 2
SINGAPORE 66 6 21180 1 5.8
THAILAND 204 5 11909 3 3.3
TOTAL 1832 61440




COMPOSITION OF TWO-WAY TRADE
COUNTRY MAJOR EXPORTS TO MAJOR IMPORTS FROM
Singapore computer valves, ADP machines,
aircraft, ADP computer valves,
machines, music, ADP ADP parts,
parts, civil eng telecommunications
plant/equipment, oil equipment,
(not crude), engs radiobroadcast
and motors, receivers, organic-
telecommunications inorganic mixtures,
equipment, elec apparel, electrical
circuits, machinery machinery
Indonesia Cotton, civil footwear, natural
engineering equip- rubber, crude oil,
ment, aircraft, pulp plywood, men/women
and waste paper, coats, oil (not
telecommunications crude), apparel,
equipment, plastics crustacean, toys




cations equipment, equipment, toys
pumps, engs and recorders, ADP
motors machines, apparel
Philippines computer valves, computer valves,
wheat, paper, apparel,
telecommunications telecommunications
equipment, cotton, equipment, toys,
machinery, animal veg fats and oil
feed, ADP machines crude, toys
Thailand aircraft, computer ADP machines, fish
valves, ADP parts, and crustaceans,









Of United States exports to the EA/P region, 18
percent are received by countries in the Southeast Asian sub-
region. This percentage is up from 15 percent in 1966 but,
down from the high of 20 percent in 1982. United States
exports to countries in the Southeast Asian sub-region are
listed in Table 6.
TABLE 6
UNITED STATES EXPORTS TO SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES
(IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
COUNTRY 1966 RANK 1992 RANK % OF
TOTAL TOTAL EA/P
EXPORT
BURMA 24 7 4 8 < 1
CAMBODIA 2 9 0 10 < 1
LAOS 9 8 1 9 < 1
VIETNAM 311 2 5 7 < 1
BRUNEI 0 10 453 6 < 1
INDONESIA 60 4 2778 4 2.1
MALAYSIA 46 6 4396 2 3.3
PHILIPPINES 348 1 2753 5 2.1
SINGAPORE 51 5 9620 1 7.3
THAILAND 128 3 3982 3 3.0
TOTAL 978 _1 23992
Source: International Monetary Fund, Annual Direction of
Trade Statistics.
C. Importa
Of United States imports from the EA/P region, 16
percent are received from the countries in the Southeast Asian
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sub-region. While remaining relatively static since 1966,
this percentage is down from the high of 21 percent in 1980.
United States imports from countries in the Southeast Asian
sub-region are listed in Table 7.
TABLE 7
UNITED STATES IMPORTS FROM SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES
(IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
COUNTRY 1966 RANK 1992 RANK % OF
TOTAL TOTAL EA/P
IMPORTS
BURMA 3 6 42 6 < 1
CAMBODIA 1 8 0 9 < 1
LAOS 1 9 6 8 < 1
VIETNAM 2 7 0 10 < 1
BRUNEI 0 10 30 7 < 1
INDONESIA 179 2 4704 4 2%
MALAYSIA 177 3 8540 2 3.7%
PHILIPPINES 398 1 4623 5 2%
SINGAPORE 15 5 11,560 1 5%
THAILAND 76 4 7927 3 3.4%
TOTAL 852 37,432
Source: International Monetary Fund, Annual Direction of
Trade Statistics.
d. Inveatments
The percentage of United States direct investment
abroad in the EA/P region that lies in the Southeast Asian
sub-region was 19 percent in 1992. The United States
currently has over $16.7 billion invested within ASEAN alone.
In addition, the average annual rate of return on Southeast
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Asian investment from 1987-1991 was 26.5 percent, led by
Indonesia and followed by Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and
the Philippines. Specific United States direct investment
positions abroad in the Southeast Asian sub-region are listed
in Table 8.
TABLE 8
UNITED STATES DIRECT INVESTMENT POSITION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
(IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
COUNTRY 1992 INVEST- % OF EA/P
MENT POSITION RANK INVESTMENT
BURMA 42 7 < 1
CAMBODIA * 8 < 1
LAOS * 9 < 1
VIETNAM * 10 < 1
BRUNEI 42 6 < 1
INDONESIA 4278 2 5.5
MALAYSIA 1714 4 2.2
PHILIPPINES 1565 5 2.0
SINGAPORE 6631 1 8.5
THAILAND 2459 3 3.1
TOTAL 16731 __
* Less than $500 thousand invested.
Source: United States Department of Commerce, Survey of
Current Business.
a. Joba
According to the U.S. Commerce Department, every $1
billion of exports supports about 20,000 jobs. United States
exports to the Southeast Asian sub-region employ over 479,840
Americans (18.2% of EA/P total), up from 172,060 just six
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years ago. In the past six years, the rate of increase in
jobs from exports to ASEAN was 278 percent. Table 9 shows
the number of American jobs provided by each Southeast Asian
country.
TABLE 9
AMERICAN JOBS FROM EXPORTS TO SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES
(FOR 1992)
COUNTRY TOTAL RANK % OF EA/P
JOBS JOBS
BURMA * 7 < 1
CAMBODIA * 8 < 1
VIETNAM * 9 < 1
LAOS * 10 < 1
BRUNEI * 6 < 1
INDONESIA 55,560 4 2.1
MALAYSIA 87,920 2 3.3
PHILIPPINES 55,060 5 2.1
SINGAPORE 192,400 1 7.3
THAILAND 79,640 3 3.1
TOTAL 2,540,000 1 18.2
* Less than 20,000
3. International Goodwill
In leaving the Cold War paradigm behind, goodwill must
be expanded to include more than friends and allies within
ASEAN. Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Burma (or Myanmar) are
also part of that region, and until they are completely
incorporated into this prosperous region, ASEAN will not be
able to function as a complete whole.
58
With specific reference to the Philippines beyond
Subic Bay, the United States has built a long political
relationship which should continue to be nurtured. As stated
by Senator Richard Lugar in 1985,
... it would be a grave mistake to conceive of the United
States-Philippines relationship strictly in terms of
maintaining United States access to these bases. What
really counts for the United States is the relationship
with the Filipino people and the Philippine nation. The
ultimate viability of the United States-Philippine
relationship lies in the profound and genuine
understanding between our two peoples and our two nations
and in the common values we share. ... U.S. policy should
be to perpetuate that broader, fundamental relationship...
[Ref. 32]
Clearly, the United States has fundamental, long-term
national interests in the EA/P region and Southeast Asia.
Therefore, it is my hypothesis that beyond Subic Bay, the
United States will not abandon those interests. However,
before looking to future means and policies that the United
States may pursue in protecting and promoting national
interests, past policies to protect and promote national
interests must be examined.
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V. PAST POLICIES TO SUPPORT NATIONAL INTERESTS IN SOUTNMAST
ASIA
In the atmosphere of the Cold War, the United States'
first responsibility was to determine who were its allies and
friends. Having done that, the United States tried to
formulate the best policies possible (global, regional and
bilateral) to protect and promote its own best interests and
the best interests of those who committed themselves to
common purposes. Conversely, the United States and its allies
exerted their best efforts to contain their common enemies.
As judged by results, the record of the Cold War years has
been fairly successful.
A. FORCES
The United States fundamental reliance to promote and
protect its interests has been placed in its forces abroad.
The presence of United States troops, ready to fight and
committed to the defense of foreign soil as part of the United
States comprehensive system of alliances for mutual defense,
was one of the most important contributions to the United
States political posture during the Cold War.
[Ref. 33] Even if these forces were only tokens of
United States military power, they illustrated the
determination of the United States to maintain a military
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posture in support of friends and allies. These forces, some
have said, were to "serve as a trigger to release the full war
potential of the United States"[Ref 33] if and when needed.
The positioning of United States military forces overseas
was consistent with the strategic thought of using a thin line
of forward deployed combat-ready forces, scattered along the
entire periphery of the Free World to contain the Soviet
Union.[Ref 331 In short, the leaders of the United States
recognized that the United States could not go it alone in
containing the Soviet Union, either in an isolationist sense
or by assuming the entire military burden for the defense of
the Free World.[Ref 33]31
In support of the perimeter defense strategy, the United
States deployed forces forward in the Pacific theater to South
Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam, along
with afloat units. Appendix I shows the levels of forces
committed to foreign areas from FY1964 to FY1992. While the
Pacific force manning level has declined from 231,000 troops
in FY1964 to 110,000 in FY1992, the percentage of United
States troops committed to the Pacific theater have only
declined from 31% in FY1964 to 28% in FY1992. In contrast,
while United States troops committed to the Atlantic theater
have declined from 436,000 in FY1964 to 243,000 in FY1992, the
3' This posture assumed that other nations of the free
world accepted and were willing to fulfill their role as part
of the mutual security system.
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percentage of United States troops committed to this theater
have risen from 58% in FY1964 to 62% in FY1992.
In contrast to the perimeter defense strategy, the strong,
alert, highly-mobile centralized reserve strategic school of
thought[Ref 33] has been gaining momentum in recent years.
This can be seen in the retrenchment of United States forces
committed to foreign deployment sites due to limitations on
military resources - personnel, equipment, and money. In
support of this strategy, most of the military's equipment and
supplies must be prepositioned to support the advantage of
strategic airlift. The 1993 Bottom-Up review includes force
enhancements in support of this objective.[Ref. 34]
B. BABES
The United States began, in 1898, to develop a pattern of
overseas bases. In the Pacific, its base system began with
the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands, Guam, and the
Philippines. At the turn of the century, Germany, Japan, and
the British laid claim to the islands inbetween these
footholds, and the United States watched with indignation.
After World War I, the United States allowed for the
division of the German Islands in the Pacific between the
Japanese and British. It has been said that the United States
doomed itself to the island hopping campaigns of World War II
by allowing for this action. Even if the United States had
acquired these islands, though, the failure to fortify them,
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as was seen in the destruction of Guam and the Philippines,
would have left them to the same fate. [Ref. 35]
With the onset of World War II, the United States realized
that a chain of Pacific island defenses would need to be
developed, first, to protect Hawaii and supply Australia,
second, to push the Japanese back to their starting point. [Ref
35] With the end of the Second World War came the United
Nations declaration that the Pacific Islands would be put in
a trusteeship under the administration of the United States.
With the intensity surrounding the bipolar standoff
between the United States and the Soviet Union rising, joint
military planning along with general development programs
ensued.[Ref. 361 As Captain Dissette says,
Here lay the foundation for the establishment of United
States overseas bases in a ring designed to contain the
Soviet Union and its satellites. Two wars in the 20th
century and the rapid development of explosive situations
in the post-World War II era had convinced the United
States that its first line of defense no longer lay in the
Western Hemisphere. To insure its security, the support
of strong allies with sufficient courage to permit the
United States to establish advance bases on their soil was
essential.[Ref 361
After the Korean War broke out, the United States
redoubled its efforts to pursue collective security on a
world-wide bases. The United States needed more bases in the
Pacific to protect the seaward fringes of Asia, namely Japan
and the Philippines. The pattern of communist expansion in
the Far East was met with the establishment and enhanced
development of United States overseas bases in the
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Philippines, South Korea, Japan, Vietnam, Taiwan, and
Thailand. These bases became the foundation for the
Eisenhower-Dulles strategy of massive retaliation."'
By the end of 1954, the United States had completed enough
alliances to establish a credible overseas base complex for
the containment of the Soviet Union to mainland Asia.
However, with the fall of Dien Bien Phu, the United States
shifted gears and decided that the entire communist world must
be contained, including mainland China.(Ref 36]
Due to rising nationalism, doubts as to the United States
ability to deter or repel an attack against them, threats by
Khrushchev that United States military presence on anothers
soil would cause them to be considered an enemy of the Soviet
Union, and the unease surrounding the presence of nuclear
weapons, some allies began to question the wisdom of allowing
a United States military presence on their soil.[Ref 36]
Therefore, in some cases, the United States was not authorized
to use facilities for combat operations outside the host
nation without first getting their permission.3
At the same time, growing domestic concern about the
rapidly rising cost of security, led President Eisenhower to
"32 Massive retaliation required a diversified military
base for the launching of nuclear weapons.
33 Remarkedly, the United States was not authorized to use
its facilities in the Philippines for bombing raids during the
Vietnam War. Long-range bombing was conducted from facilities
in Guam.
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express his concern to Congress in his State of the Union
address in January 1959
'The material foundation of our national safety is a
strong and expanding economy. The basic question facing
us today is more than survival. It is the preservation of
a way of life.'[Ref 36]
Captain Dissette also points out that
By the President's own figures, the United States needed
to spend $47 billion, or more than 60% of the federal
budget, in fiscal 1960 for national defense.[Ref 36]
However, the domestic populace's fear of global communism,
instilled continuously in them for the past twelve years by
political leadership, continued to justify the existence and
development of overseas bases.
If the existence of any one base serves as a deterrent to
war, the expenditures are most certainly justified.[Ref
36]
With the advancement of military technology - increased
capabilities for the aircraft carrier and missile launching
submarines (mobile launching platforms instead of fixed bases)
along with long range missiles and aircraft - and wariness of
the strategy of massive retaliation, overseas bases became
essentially obsolete as weapons launching sites. However,
overseas bases took on a new role; providing logistical
support for forward deployed conventional forces.
After the Vietnam War, once again overseas bases in the
Pacific began to create political - domestic and international
- problems for the United States government. The United
States vacated its bases in Thailand and Vietnam. The United
65
States turned the administration of Okinawa back over to
Japan. After restoring relations with mainland China, the
United States vacated facilities in Taiwan (along with the
mutual defense treaty) in order to appease its former enemy.
After 94 years of maintaining military facilities in the
Philippines, the most important United States logistical and
training facilities in the Pacific, the United States withdrew
its forces from their soil in 1992. As such, Japan and South
Korea host the only United States overseas bases left in the
Pacific.
Today, United States governmental policy is to make
further use of overseas bases. The Secretary of Defense
validates this policy as follows:
The United States needs overseas bases to sustain its
forward presence and to provide facilities for regional
contingency operations during periods of crises. Our
successes in the Persian Gulf were due in no small measure
to our access to overseas bases. Foreign bases enhance
deterrence, contribute to regional stability, and
facilitate rapid response by U.S. forces. [Ref 38]
C. ALLIANCZS
Security relationships have been a major tool of American
foreign policy since the Second World War. In the forty-plus
years since that conflict ended, the United States has been
through three major periods of security relationships
formation, and today it remains committed to literally dozens
of nations around the globe. [Ref. 371
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1. Collective Defense Treaty SyStem
The first set of treaties was negotiated in 1951.
When John Foster Dulles sought opinion in the Pacific region
on an early and lenient Japanese Peace Treaty (due to the rise
in intensity of the Cold War standoff), he found that the
Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand demanded United States
commitments as protection against a rearmed Japan. (Ref 37]
Those nations refused to enter into a multilateral pact with
their recent enemy and these three treaties, signed separately
in 1951, remain in effect today.
The second set of treaties was negotiated under the
Eisenhower-Dulles administration. Far more Cold War oriented
than the previous set of treaties, Dulles' alliance system
could be seen as perfecting the containment of the Soviet
Union and its Chinese ally around its perimeter.[Ref 37] The
alliance with South Korea had been signed to reinsure the
armistice which ended the Korean War, by making it evident
that the United States would come to the aid of South Korea in
case of a second attack. The Southeast Asia Collective
Defense Treaty, on the other hand, was an American scheme to
hold the line against further communist gains in Indochina
after the First Indochina War. (Ref 37] Lastly, the mutual
defense treaty with the Republic of China, was signed to give
communist China second thoughts about invading the nationalist
China island of Taiwan.
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These collective security arrangements continue to be
defined as an essential component of the United States
national security strategy. As stated in the Secretary of
Defense' 1992 Annual Report to Congress,
Our security alliances provide a clear demonstration of
our commitments, help to deter potential aggressors,
enhance regional stability by lowering the potential for
conflict, reduce expenditures, and reassure allies that
they do not have to rely solely on their own resources in
order to protect themselves from external threats.
[Ref. 38]
Therefore, these treaties warrant careful examination.
a. Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States
and the Republic of the Philippinea
The Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States
and the Republic of the Philippines was signed in Washington
on August 30, 1951. This treaty was a precondition for
eliciting the Philippines to sign a Peace Treaty with Japan.
While
Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of
unity and their common determination to defend themselves
against external armed attack, so that no potential
aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them
stands alone in the Pacific Area,
and
Desiring further to strengthen their present efforts for
collective defense for the preservation of peace and
security pending the development of a more comprehensive
system of regional security in the Pacific Area,
the operative clause of the treaty in the event of armed
attack is
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Each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific
Area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its
own peace and safety and declares that it would act to
meet the common dangers in accordance with its
constitutional processes.
and
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result
thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security
Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be
terminated when the Security Council has taken measures
necessary to restore and maintain international peace and
security. (Ref. 39]
b. The Security Treaty Between Australia, New
Zealand, and the United States (ANZUS)
The ANZUS Treaty (U.S. security obligations were
suspended to New Zealand August 11, 1986 as a result of its
decision to ban U.S. nuclear-powered and nuclear-capable ships
from its ports) was signed at San Francisco on September 1,
1951. As with the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of
the Philippines, the ANZUS Treaty was also a precondition for
eliciting Australia and New Zealand to sign a Peace treaty
with Japan. While
Noting that the United States already has arrangements
pursuant to which its armed forces are stationed in the
Philippines, and has armed forces and administrative
responsibilities in the Ryukyus, and upon the coming into
force of the Japanese Peace Treaty may also station armed
forces in and about Japan to assist in the preservation of
peace and security in the Japan Area,
and
Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of
unity, so that no potential aggressor could be under the
illusion that any of them stand along in the Pacific Area,
and
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Desiring further to coordinate their efforts for
collective defense for the preservation of peace and
security pending the development of a more comprehensive
system of regional security in the Pacific Area,
the operative clause of the treaty in the event of armed
attack is
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific
Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own
peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet
the common danger in accordance with its constitutional
processes.
and
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result
thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security
Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be
terminated when the Security Council has taken measures
necessary to restore and maintain international peace and
security. (Ref. 401
C. Treaty of Nutual Cooperation and Security Between
the United States and Japan
The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security
between the United States and Japan, currently in force, was
signed at Washington January 19, 1960.34 While
Desiring to strengthen the bonds of peace and friendship
traditionally existing between them, and to uphold the
principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule
of law,
and
Desiring further to encourage closer economic cooperation
between them and to promote conditions of economic
stability and well-being in their countries,
34 This treaty superseded the previous Security Treaty




Considering that they have a common concern in the
maintenance of international peace and security in the Far
East,
the operative clause of the treaty in the event of armed
attack is
Each party recognizes that an armed attack against either
Party in the territories under the administration of Japan
would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and
declares that it would act to meet the common danger in
accordance with constitutional provisions and processes.
In addition
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result
thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security
Council of the United nations in accordance with the
provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures
shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken
the measures necessary to restore and maintain
international peace and security,
and
For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan
and the maintenance of international peace and security in
the Far East, the United States of America is granted the
use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and
areas in Japan,
and
This treaty shall remain in force until in the opinion of
the Governments of the United States of America and Japan
there shall have come into force such United Nations
arrangements as will satisfactorily provide for the
maintenance of international peace and security in the
Japan area... [Ref. 41]
d. The Mutual Defenae Treaty Between the Unitod
States and the Republic of Korea
The Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States
and Republic of Korea was signed at Washington on October 1,
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1953. This treaty was signed by the United States in exchange
for the Republic of Korea's cooperation in arranging an
armistice to end the Korean war. While
Reaffirming their desire to live in peace with all peoples
and all governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric
of peace in the Pacific area,
and
Desiring to declare publicly and formally their common
determination to defend themselves against external armed
attack so that no potential aggressor could be under the
illusion that either of them stands alone in the Pacific
area,
and
Desiring further to strengthen their efforts for
collective defense for the preservation of peace and
security pending the development of a more comprehensive
and effective system of regional security in the Pacific
area,
the operative clause of the treaty in the event of armed
attack is
Each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific
area on either of the Parties in territories not under
their respective administrative control, or hereafter
recognized by one of the parties as lawfully brought under
the administrative control of the other, would be
dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it
would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its
constitutional processes.
In addition
The Republic of Korea grants, and the United States of
America accepts, the rights to dispose United States land,
air and sea forces in and about the territory of the
Republic of Korea as determined by mutual agreement.
[Ref. 42]
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o. The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty
The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty was
signed in Manila on September 8, 1954, by the United States,
Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Republic of the
Philippines, the Kingdom of Thailand, and the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Today, this treaty
remains in effect on a bilateral basis between the United
States and Thailand. While
Intending to declare publicly and formally their sense of
unity, so that any potential aggressor will appreciate
that the Parties stand together in the area,
and
Desiring further to coordinate their efforts for
collective defense for the preservation of peace and
security,
the operative clause in the treaty in the event of armed
attack is
Each party recognizes that aggression by means of armed
attack in the treaty area against any of the parties or
against any state or territory which the parties by
unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would
endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will
in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance
with its constitutional processes. Measures taken under
this paragraph shall be immediately reported to the
Security Council of the United Nations.
However, in executing the ý'reaty, the United States did so
understanding that its recognition of the effect of
aggression and armed attack and its agreement with
reference thereto in Article IV, paragraph I, apply only
to communist aggression. [Ref. 43]
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f. The MUtual Defense Treaty Between the United
States and the RepublIc of China
The Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States
and the Republic of China (Taiwan) was signed in Washington on
December 2, 1954. This treaty was signed to contain Sino-
communism to communist China, and assist Nationalist China in
maintaining its sovereignty. With the normalization of Sino-
American relations on December 15, 1978, this treaty was
terminated in 1979. While
Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of
unity and their common determination to defend themselves
against external armed attack, so that no potential
aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them
stands alone in the West Pacific area,
and
Desiring further to strengthen their present efforts for
collective defense for the preservation of peace and
security pending the development of a more comprehensive
system of regional security in the West Pacific Area,
the operative clause of the treaty in the event of armed
attack is
Each party recognizes that an armed attack in the West
Pacific Area directed against the territories of either of
the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety
and declares that it would act to meet the common danger
in accordance with its constitutional processes
and
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result
thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security
Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be
terminated when the Security Council has taken the




The government of the Republic of China grants, and the
government of the United States of America accepts, the
right to dispose such United States land, air, and sea
forces in and about Taiwan and the Pescadores as may be
required for their defense, as determined by mutual
agreement. [Ref. 44]
2. Friends and Alliances
The preceding section reveals who are the United
States allies. But the United States needed more than allies,
so it considered it a national interest to look out for its
friends as well as its allies. Under this heading the author
presumes we mean the former non-aligned and all except the
sworn communists. Since the end of the Cold War, this heading
"friends and allies" is meaningless as a factor in the
formulation of policy. Everybody is a potential friend; we
want to make the world better and safer for everyone; not just
our allies and friends.
While always concerned that the United States might
overextend itself, the founder of containment, George Kennan,
said that America needed allies to share the burdens of free
world leadership, and that the United States needed a strong
defense posture to sustain allied cooperation. In the end,
though, Kennan was against alliances as primary tools of
American national security policy.3"
35 Diebel states that Kennan preferred a 'particularist'
rather than a 'universalist' approach to foreign policy; he
was extremely doubtful of 'the ability of men to define
hypothetically in any useful way, by means of general and
legal phraseology, future situations which no one could really
imagine or envisage.'
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'I had little confidence in the value of written treaties
of alliance generally. I had seen too many instances in
which they had been forgotten, or disregarded, or found to
be irrelevant, or distorted for ulterior purposes when the
chips were down.'[Ref 37]
Nevertheless, Kennan's school of containment based on
political and economic containment was superseded by the
military school of containment. The military school of
containment saw the Soviet Union as a uniquely expansionist
state, driven by ideology to conquer the world for communism,
a nation which understands only force and with which no
settlement will ever be possible; hence, virtually all areas
of the world were deemed vital to the overall balance of
power. Allies seemed essential to contain Soviet power and
its communist allies.
Therefore, under the Truman-Acheson administration,
alliances were entered into to provide the framework for
defense relationships among the world's leading "free"
countries. These alliances were to contain the aggression of
any communist military force.
Under the Eisenhower-Dulles administration, alliances
were expanded to include those nations who were not
necessarily vital to maintaining a global balance of power.
They were the products of specific situations: Japan, South
Korea, the Republic of China, and the states signatory to the
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. Diebel sees these
alliances as
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tactical responses to the failure of that (massive
retaliation) strategy - last-minute, crisis-driven efforts
to make credible a deterrent threat that otherwise could
hardly be believed.
Collectively, however, Dulles' alliances draped American
protection around Third World states who could hardly be of
material help (except in manpower) should a war actually
start.[Ref 37]
A further system of postwar security commitments was
negotiated under the Reagan administration. Geographically,
these commitments centered on the Third World, but in a much
more diffuse and far-ranging pattern. Lacking treaties, the
new commitments were based far more on arms transfers and
military training, economic aid, ad hoc diplomatic contact,
and facilities construction or use.[Ref 37) Since these new
security partners cannot be called allies in the traditional
sense; they have been dubbed "friends," and American freedom
of action with regard to them remains at a relatively high
level. These nations included Burma, Indonesia, and Malaysia
in the Southeast Asian sub-region.
Today, United States governmental policy is to make
further use of this framework of friends and allies. The
Secretary of Defense validates this policy as follows:
Cooperation makes it possible to reduce duplication with
and among allies and thus conserves scarce defense
resources. The United States armed forces have unique
capabilities, which can enhance the security of our
allies. It is equally true that some of our allies
maintain assets that can make a significant contribution
to a coalition effort. Alliance arrangements have made
possible host-nation support and other arrangements to
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share the mutual defense burden, which reduce the cost of
forward presence on the U.S. taxpayer and make it possible
to reach agreements on sharing responsibilities and roles
with allies and friends. (Ref 38]
But as suggested above, this policy needs re-examination in
the light of the end of the Cold War.
3. Containment of Comon ummies
Although containment's founder never set forth in one
place the full scope of his strategic vision, scholars who
have studied Kennan's writings maintain that his view of the
concept is internally cohesive and broadly consistent over
time.
The first stage of Kennan's containment strategy
argued for an active U.S. policy to maintain the world balance
of power in the special circumstances following World War II.
This meant preventing the Soviets from acquiring control of
the remaining centers of world industrial capacity other than
the Soviet Union and the United States, all which had been
weakened by the war: specifically, the industrial heart of
Europe, Japan, and the United Kingdom. (Ref 37] Second,
containment was intended to limit Soviet influence outside Lhe
regions Moscow already controlled, which in Kennan's time
pointed to a policy aimed at dividing and weakening the world
communist movement.[Ref 37] Finally, Kennan hoped that over
time the Soviet view of international politics could be
modified to permit a negotiated settlement with the West and
a modus vivendi between the superpowers, vastly reducing Cold
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War tensions and establishing a global balance which could
ensue without constant and intensive American involvement. [Ref
37]
In applying the theory of containment, though, Kennan
worried that if the United States started creating a structure
of anti-Soviet alliances, there would be
'no logical stopping point until that system has circled
the globe and embraced all the non-communist countries of
Europe, Asia, and Africa.'[Ref 37]
In addition, Kennan opposed anti-Soviet alliances because he
deplored their emphasis on a single means of containment - the
use of alliances would militarize United States relationships
with much of the world, diverting allies energies from the
tasks of political and economic reconstruction so necessary
for resistance to the real threats of ideological subversion
and political infiltration.[Ref 37]
Expanding on Kennan's theory of containment, the
National Security Council began working in early 1950 on a
highly secret document that came to be known as NSC-68. NSC-
68 was the American blueprint for waging the Cold War for the
next twenty years.[Ref. 45]
NSC-68 began with two assumptions.
First, the global balance of power had been 'fundamentally
altered' since the nine-teenth century so that the
Americans and Russians now dominated the world: 'What is
new, what makes the continuing crisis, is the polarization
of power which inescapably confronts the slave society
with the free.' It was us against them. Second, 'the
Soviet Union, unlike previous aspirants to hegemony, is
animated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own,
and seeks to impose its absolute authority,' initially in
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'the Soviet Union and second in the areas now under its
control.' ... 'In the minds of the Soviet leaders,
however, achievement of this design requires the dynamic
extension of their authority and the ultimate elimination
of any effective opposition to their authority. ... To
that end Soviet efforts are now directed toward the
domination of the Eurasian land mass.'[Ref 451
Therefore, NSC-68 moved to the inevitable conclusion that the
United States
'must lead in building a successfully functioning
political and economic system in the free world,' for 'the
absence of order among nations is becoming less and less
tolerable.'
The key to impose order around the globe and to deter an
attack on the United States was to become military power,
beyond mere deterrence. Limited wars were also to be fought
'to compel the acceptance of terms consistent with our
objectives.'(Ref 451
A lessening of international tensions became possible
in 1967-1968 when the United States suffered from setbacks in
Vietnam and the Soviet Union had "approached strategic parity"
with the United States.[Ref 45] President Johnson, initially
pursuing detente in the hopes that he could persuade the
Soviets to pressure Ho Chi Minh to make peace, realized that
global international relations were first on the Soviets'
table. Initial stages of this detente meant a lessening of
military and political tensions between the two great powers,
but ideological coexistence could not yet be allowed. [Ref 451
Detente came further into bloom during the Nixon
administration as an era of negotiation began. Nixon and
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Kissinger visited Moscow and Beijing, removed the United
States militarily from Vietnam, and reduced United States
military commitments abroad (Nixon Doctrine). Brezhnev and
Nixon designed a detente policy and trade relations were
reinvigorated with Beijing to help the ailing American
economy. In the subsequent Carter administration, the
restoration of formal diplomatic relations between Beijing and
Washington was announced in 1978. In return, the United
States gave up its treaty of mutual defense with Taiwan. As
such, NSC-68 as a guide for foreign policy in the EA/P region
became essentially obsolete.
With the onset of the Reagan administrati-on (and the
evil empire), the Cold War returned to its previous intensity.
Only this time, the Cold War was carried completely into the
developing (and non-aligned) world. Security assistance was
now provided to any country, of importance to the United
States, which remained anti-communist and supported the United
States efforts in dealing with the Soviet Union.
D. SECURITY ASSISTANCZ
In the past, security assistance has been used to bind
cooperative nations closer to the United States. The Nixon
Doctrine indicated the limits of its efforts.
1. Military Assistance
Depending upon the nature of shared interests, the
United States supplemented friends and alliances with loans
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(FMF program) for industrial-base and weapon development
cooperation, payments for overseas basing and access
agreements, demonstrations of military capability to deter
regional threats, training to enhance defense capabilities,
and where necessary joint or combined deployment of military
forces.(Ref 381 Such assistance facilitated communications
and interoperability with allied military forces, was
essential for forward presence, supported crisis response
capabilities, and defended mutual national interests. [Ref 381
In regards to the Philippines, military assistance
provided in the form of foreign military sales and grant
military assistance, has given the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) more than enough weapons to defend
themselves and kill the communist-inspired New Peoples Army
(NPA). [Ref. 46] However, these arms have consistently made
their way into the hands of the NPA through less than
professional AFP members. Hence, military assistance to the
Philippines has essentially provided the weaponry for the
prolongation of the armed insurgency and has directly impacted
the lives of many of the innocent common people. [Ref. 47]
The IMET program, on the other hand, is a low-cost
grant aid program that provides military education and
training to over 5,000 foreign military and civilian defense
personnel from over 100 countries each year. [Ref 38] IMET
exposes future leaders of many foreign defense establishments
to American thought, in regards to national security affairs
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and the corresponding relationship between the military
establishment and civilian government.
With the end of the Cold War, IMET has been expanded to
provide education for military and civilian officials from
some former Warsaw Pact countries. The IMET program is
one of the least costly and most effective programs for
maintaining United States influence and assisting foreign
countries with their development of self-defense
capabilities.[Ref 38)
2. Economic Support Asnistance
United States bilateral and multilateral economic
assistance to developing countries traditionally has focused
on both short-term national security goals and longer-term
economic social development goals.[Ref. 48) The development
goals have rested largely on moral and humanitarian precepts,
such as meeting the basic human needs of poor people, as well
as on United States national interest needs, such as
protecting and expanding markets for United States exports and
securing access to strategic materials.[Ref 48]
Economic assistance provided for the Philippines under
the auspices of security assistance, however, has not found
its way to those people in the countryside or in the city
slums who desperately need it. [Ref 47] Hence, the reason for
the people to participate in insurgency or armed guerilla
attacks remained intact, and the United States was




It has long been an assumption of classical liberalism
that the more extensive the contacts that take place
between nations, the greater are the changes for peace ...
Cultural exchange, it has been suggested, causes peoples
to become more sensitive to each others' concerns, and
hence reduces the likelihood of misunderstandings. 'People
to people' contacts, it has been assumed, make it possible
for nations to 'know' one another better; the danger of
war between them is, as a result, correspondingly reduced.
[Ref. 491
While some clearly have a wariness for classical liberal
theory, cultural exchanges have been expanding between the
United States and other nations. Cultural exchanges have been
used to support the United States own purposes by bearing
witness to its own great capabilities, ultimate good
intentions, and sincerity in winning the hearts and minds of
people. These exchanges have been in the form of Fulbright
scholars, exchange students, non-governmental organizations
(such as the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council, Asia
Foundation, Asia Society, Ford Foundation), the United States
Information Agency (USIA), and the Peace Corps. Cultural
exchanges between academia have been an effective tool in the
pursuit of national security. Increased understanding between
academia of different nations have provided an alternative,
non-governmental, route towards the formulation of foreign
policy. In addition, cultural exchanges provided by the Peace
Corps (grass roots level), have enhanced international
goodwill through providing volunteers for development
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assistance in education, agriculture, health, small-enterprise
development, and natural resource programs.[Ref. 50]
F. COOPERATION WITH NON-ALIGNED COUNTRXES
Non-alignment is the foreign policy of states who do not
identify themselves with the major power blocs but retain the
option of becoming aligned when necessary. "In the 1950s and
1960s the United States viewed 'neutrality' in the global
ideological conflict as immoral."[Ref 21] In the 1970s, as
far as Southeast Asia is concerned,
uppermost in American considerations was the loss the
United States would incur through the implementation of
ZOPFAN. It had treaties with the Philippines, South
Vietnam, and Thailand and had very large bases in two of
these countries. Malaysia and Singapore were members of
the Five-Power Defence Arrangement. All this would be
jeopardized and China and the Soviet Union would be
allowed legitimate entry into Southeast Asia.[Ref 211
Nevertheless, since the mid-1970s, the United States has held
joint military exercises36 and high level meetings with
countries belonging to the non-aligned movement.
In addition to ZOPFAN, the United States perceived the
creation of a SEANWFZ as undermining its global deterrence
posture and as likely to have unequal effects on the United
States and the Soviet Union, favoring the latter at the
expense of the former. [Ref 21] As calls came for nuclear free
zones in the Free World without corresponding calls by the
36 The United States has been holding joint military
exercises with Malaysia since 1974. Joint military exercises
are also conducted with Indonesia.
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Warsaw Pact, the United States opted to repudiate these
requests, and as far as New Zealand is concerned, suspended
its obligation to that country in the ANZUS treaty. Overall
the United States cooperated with non-aligned nations and
where necessary it compromised with its enemies (i.e., arms
control, China, Taiwan).
It is my hypothesis that beyond Subic Bay, the United
States can effectively promote and protect fundamental
national interests while playing a successful part in
contributing to regional peace and stability in Southeast
Asia. However, to be efficient and effective, this
contribution should start with a freE'• approach, leaving the
Cold War paradigm behind.3" Even more importantly, though,
while looking for future contributions to make towards
regional peace and stability, it is prudent to recall the
words of the late Hon. Philip C. Habib during testimony before
Congress after the Vietnam War:
... in terms of our interest and attitude, and our policy
toward East Asia, Indochina developments have made clear
the limits of our power to shape events in Asia ...
[Ref. 511
"•7 In leaving the Cold War adversarial paradigm behind,
I understand that issues such as MIAs in Vietnam and North
Korea, the reunification of North and South Korea, and the
renewal of formal cooperative relations with China should be
resolved.
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VI. OPPORTUNITIZS AND CHALLENGES
The Cold War is over. With the departure of the United
States' military forces from facilities in the Republic of the
Philippines, the United States has been given the opportunity
and challenge to reassess its commitments and capabilities in
protecting its national interests on the far side of the
Pacific. The success or failure, on the part of the United
States, to rise to this occasion will surely determine the
degree to which it can adequately fulfill a responsible role
in the EA/P region tomorrow.
As the United States takes a new look across the Pacific,
past policies must be modified to reflect the current
challenge presented in the EA/P region. Specifically,
"* American strategy in the Pacific remains a cautious
adaptation of eurocentric Cold War policies to the new
dynamics of a post-cold war world.[Ref. 52]
"* American strategy in the Pacific has been excessively
focused on military means to promote and protect United
States interests. The Confucian Art of War, "to subdue
the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill," will
require security policy to be more focused on diplomatic
(negotiation), political, economic, and psychological
means. 38
"* Asia in the 1990s poses a radically new challenge to
America. The military threat in the region that long
defined the paramount issues, and against which the United
States and its allies built a network of alliances, has
38 Sun Tzu's centers of gravity to attack before the
application of force are the potential adversaries strategy
and plans (will and morale) and then to disrupt its alliances.
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diminished to a level that makes the existing Cold War
security structures essentially obsolete.(Ref 52]
"• The immediate challenge Asia presents is political-
economic, but over the long haul America's broader
security is at stake.[Ref 52]
"* Politically, China and Southeast Asian countries will not
support a regional environment conducive to perceived
American values of democracy and human rights.[Ref 6]
* Politically and strategically, Southeast Asia perceives
itself as being on the periphery of United States
interests. In return, United States friends and allies
are ambivalent about strengthening any security agreements
or alliances with the United States.[Ref 6]
A. AN OBJECTIV2
I believe the time has come to create a new Pacific
Community built on shared strength, shared prosperity, and
a shared commitment to democratic values. 39
[Ref. 531
During President Clinton's visit to Seoul in July 1993, he
outlined the beginnings of a security policy for a new Pacific
Community.
Above all, the United States intends to remain actively
engaged in this region. America is, after all, a Pacific
Nation ... We have fought three wars here in this century.
We must not squander that investment. The best way for us
to deter regional aggression, perpetuate the region's
robust economic growth, and secure our own maritime and
other interests is an active presence.[Ref 53]
The four priorities of President Clinton's vision for a new
Pacific Community are
"31 While security policy can be fashioned to support a new
Pacific Community built on shared strength and shared
prosperity, it is unrealistic to expect other Asia-Pacific
nations to share a United State's commitment to democratic
values.
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"* A continued American military presence in the region.
"• Stronger efforts to combat the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction.
"* New regional dialogues on the full range of common
security challenges.
"* Support for democracy and (or?) more open societies
throughout the region.
President Clinton's hope is that
These elements of security can help create a Pacific
region where economic competition is vigorous but
peaceful; where diverse nations work as partners to
improve their shared security; where democracy, as well as
balanced military strength, takes its place as a guardian
of security.[Ref 53]
B. A STRATEGY
Edward Olsen has suggested that the United States adopt
Japan's security policy of comprehensive security, adapted for
United States interests, for application on a regional, and
perhaps global, level.[Ref. 54] It appears that South Korea
and China (and possibly some of the countries of Southeast
Asia) have already adopted this strategy.
Comprehensive security, in Japanese terms during the Cold
War, was
a way for it to stress Japan's economic role in global
security while leaving most of the military facets of
security to the United States. [Ref 541
The basic foundation of comprehensive security, as defined by
a Japanese Comprehensive National Security Study Group, July
2, 1980, (Ref. 55] is described in Table 10.
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TABLE 10
COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL SECURITY LEVELS
NARROW SECURITY POLICY ECONOMIC SECURITY POLICY
First level efforts: First level efforts: Goal
Goal is creation of a is management and
more peaceful maintenance of the
international order. independent order.
1. International 1. Maintenance of the
cooperation. free-trade system.
2. Cooperation with 2. Resolution of the





Second level efforts: Second level efforts:
Described as Described as intermediary
intermediary efforts. efforts.
1. An alliance, or 1. Promotion of friendly
cooperation with relations with a
countries sharing number of nations that
common political are important to a
ideas and interests, nation's economy.
Third level efforts: Third level efforts:
Described as self- Described as self-
restraint efforts. restraint efforts.
1. Consolidation of 1. Stockpiling.
denial capability, 2. A certain degree of
that is, capability self-sufficiency.
to prevent the easy 3. Basically, the
establishment of a maintenance of the
fait accompli; at its nation's economic
base, fostering strength, that is,
denial of the state maintaining
and society as a productivity and
whole, strong will to competitive export




Source: Yasutomo, Dennis T. The Manner of GivinQ. Lexington
Books, 1986.
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Of course, the United States does not have military means
for the pursuit of its security restricted as the Japanese
presumably do by their constitution. Peace through strength
has served America well in the past. However, as means and
policies to promote and protect United States national
interests in the EA/P region are adjusted to reflect the post-
Cold War environment in the EA/P region, George Kennan would
remind us that first and foremost
'The United States need only measure up to its own best
traditions and prove itself worthy of preservation as a
great nation.'[Ref. 56]
In addition, the embarrassments and difficulties which now
characterize United States domestic conditions indicate that
means should no longer be employed that risk destroying the
very ends they seek to secure.[Ref 56] It is clear that our
interests in the EA/P region will in no way be diminished, but
our means and capabilities of protecting those interests must
be reexamined. In the post-cold war world we need to take a
new look at our military forces, bases agreements, alliance
system, security assistance policies and people to people
programs.
C. MILITARY-SEURITY POLICY CKANGES
Advances in military technology, budgetary constraints,
changes in the art of war, and America's commitment to
economic renewal are causing major upheavals in security
planning in the post-cold war era. Military analysts are
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concerned that a serious erosion in military preparedness may
be in the making."0 [Ref. 57] Downsizing (or rightsizing)
calls for reduced military numbers while preserving a forward
presence. Advances in military technology (mobile theater
ballistic missile defense systems) and the move towards a
strong central strategic policy (based on CONUS and forward
bases on United States territory in the Pacific), displaces
the need for United States bases on foreign soil and increases
reliance on accessibility agreements for peacetime operational
logistical support. No longer needing to provide military
assistance payments to retain basing or access rights,
security assistance can be reprogrammed to distribute
assistance based on functional categories in accordance with
national objectives.
1. Roduction of Numbors with Need for Continuod Prosonce
Although countries in the Southeast Asian sub-region
are generally calling for a reduced presence of U.S. military
forces, they still feel that the United States should remain
engaged in Asia to alleviate any possibility of a regional
hegemon appearing. [Ref 61 Of biggest concern is China's claim
of sovereignty over the South China Sea with the potential to
40 Excessive restrictions on defense spending and
excessive commitments to peacekeeping and humanitarian
operations may be reducing military readiness programs to
unacceptable levels.
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back it up with force.4'[Ref. 581 Southeast Asian countries
also feel that the United States-Japan military security
arrangement is vital to ensuring stability in the EA/P
region.[Ref. 59]
The military strategic value of the Southeast Asian
sub-region to the United States in the post-cold war era has
decreased immeasurably. 42 The evolving military capabilities
of the Southeast Asian countries"3 , makes it possible for the
United States to reduce its forward deployed military presence
in Southeast Asia. In addition, permanent deployment of large
numbers of military forces would indicate what David Fromkin
[Ref 84] calls de facto commitments," of which the United
41 A continued United States presence in Southeast Asia
is desirable due to the dichotomy in China's policy regarding
the South China Sea (i.e., they want sovereignty over the
South China Sea and at the same time they want good relations
with their ASEAN neighbors). In addition, while a continued
U.S. presence will not stop or even significantly slow the
growth of indigenous forces, it will provide a framework for
orderly growth and conservative use of those forces.
42 However, the sub-region is still of strategic
significance as a back-up route in case of closure of the Suez
Canal.
4' The rapid military build-up and modernization of
Southeast Asian navies and air forces has significantly
increased the ability and scope of these countries to monitor
the sea lines of communication and corresponding exclusive
economic zones.
" Fromkin defines alliance commitments into three
categories: (1) de jure commitments - those legally binding by
international law, of which the United States has none; (2)
apparent commitments - obligations we believe ourselves to
have undertaken, even though not legally binding. These are
essentially political commitments which the legislative branch
could overrule; and (3) de facto commitments - material
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States should no longer pursue in a less than vital sub-
region. In short, United States military forces cannot be
sensibly committed to either fight any local insurgency, any
local territorial skirmish, or defend any elite-led
government.[Ref 471
Looking beyond the Southeast Asian sub-region, a
credible United States military presence in the EA/P region is
universally desired, but we must ask ourselves just what it is
that we expect those forces to do? Promoting and protecting
fundamental United States national interests during peacetime
gives rise to the plausible missions of the evacuation of
American personnel in crisis situations, monitoring the
freedom of the seas for commerce, fostering goodwill through
military to military relations, and balanced military strength
for deterrence. Does it take 98,000 military personnel to do
this in a peacetime, maritime environment?
United States under-secretary of Defense for Policy
Frank Wisner believes so. He has stated that the defense
department is aiming to hold Pacific force levels at
approximately the same levels in the years ahead.
[Ref. 60] However, the Asia-Pacific region is a
maritime theater. Therefore, are the 98,000 troops the right
military personnel for Pacific maritime operations in that
dispositions (usually the placement of military forces on
foreign soil) that make it practically unfeasible for the
United States to refrain from action.
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they are constantly flexible and mobile without implying any
de facto miliLary commitment?
TI.- United States still retains large numbers of
permanent based military personnel in Japan and South Korea.
Each has identified the other as a threat in the post-cold war
era. Japan also cites potential adversaries as China and
Russia.
Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of
Europe (Asia), entangle our peace and prosperity in the
toils of European (Asian) ambition, rivalship, interest,
humour, or caprice? [Ref 141
There is no longer any reason for United States military
personnel to be deployed as tripwires to satisfy the
psychological needs of other nations or to prove the United
States creditability in the post-cold war era. [Ref 85] Three
American-led wars in the Pacific in the last 50 years provides
ample evidence that the United States lives up to its
commitments and protects its interests.
It appears that the United States government is still
providing for a global interventionary force structure. This
gives credence to charges that security planners are not yet
realizing that the Pax-Americana days are gone, and that the
new international system will be beyond the control of
order.[Ref. 611 Earl Ravenal believes that
A noninterventionist defense program, after a five-year
sequence of cuts, would cost (in 1991 dollars) $150
billion; require 1.125 million military personnel; and
provide six army divisions and two marine divisions,
eleven air force tactical air wings, and six carriers with
five air wings, in addition to a dyad of strategic nuclear
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forces consisting of submarine-launched ballistic missiles
and bombers with medium-range cruise missiles. These
forces, no longer committed to overseas defense, would be
based in the United States. This program would produce,
over a half a decade, a further cumulative peace dividend,
beyond the $227 billion already predictable, of $333
billion (or a total of $560 billion). [Ref 611
While detailed force structuring and planning is beyond the
scope of this analysis, there does appear to be some room for
negotiation between a global interventionary force that
assumes the United States alone must continue to protect
friends and allies and an America first force structure, where
all nations chip in.
2. Accessibility Arrangements in Lieu of Bases
The Pacific Fleet Basing study completed by the Center
for Naval Analysis (CNA) in May 1993 summarizes that the loss
of Subic Bay initially threatens overall fleet readiness more
than it threatens presence. However, forward presence becomes
jeopardized indirectly by the readiness problem.
[Ref. 62] Recommendations provided by CNA for the
Pacific Fleet are:
Continue the search for alternatives to meet the fleet's
readiness needs by relying on facilities while keeping the
homeports in Japan. Alternatives provided by CNA include
(1) relying more on United States sites for making greater
use of Guam for certain logistics and training needs or
returning air wing personnel to Alaska or other United
States sites for critical training; (2) on a small scale,
airlift the crews for small ships to forward areas to keep
the ships out longer; and (3) use multiple crews and
shorter maintenance and work up cycles for aircraft
carriers at California homeports to get more forward time
per carrier.
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"• Accept lower readiness standards for the clear, force-
multiplier advantages accrued to the presence mission from
the homeports in Japan.
"* Give up the homeports in Japan and the forward presence
advantages that they convey by withdrawing to United
States west coast homeports to better exploit the
readiness opportunities available at CONUS sites. [Ref 621
CNA's study estimates that a continued United States
tenure at Japanese bases are reasonably optimistic for at
least 4-5 years. However, due to Japanese and United States
political considerations along with the dynamics of the
current upheaval of the international system, the availability
of United States bases in Japan thereafter is unpredictable.
Without forward basing of the Independence battle group in
Japan, a strategy that emphasized equal maritime presence in
both Southwest Asia and Northeast Asia/Northwest Pacific could
at best be achieved only 40 percent of the time (assuming 6
carriers are maintained by the Pacific fleet).[Ref 621 This
indicates that priorities will have to be changed.
When searching for access availability, the CNA study
cited the following national and transnational issues which
affected access availability in Asia: (1) regional stability
(Arabian Gulf oil, North Korea, emergent power balances,
freedom of navigation, and territorial disputes); (2)
budgetary and cost containment issues, national economies and
burden sharing, trade and investments, and environment); and
(3) national identify and cultural issues (anti-colonialism,
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intrusiveness of U.S. forces, human rights sensitivities, and
status of forces agreements).
In CNA's study, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and
Malaysia fell into the first category. The prospect of
turbulence in mainland China, war or normalization on the
"'rean peninsula, mitigating the animosity many East Asians
feel towards Japan and reestablishment of some acceptable
relationship with Russia were described as important
centripetal forces for retaining U.S. naval forces in and
around Japan.[Ref 62] Polling data conducted during CNA's
study, though, cited 63% of Japanese and 51% of Americans
favoring a gradual reduction of U.S. forces from Okinawa."5
In CNA's study, the Philippines, Indonesia, and
Australia fell into the last two categories of budgetary and
cost containment issues along with national identity and
cultural issues. The Philippines and Australia cited burden
sharing due to treaties with the United States as a reason for
granting access.[Ref 621 Politically, however, the rising
salience of environmental issues - noise from aircraft
engines, hazardous waste disposal, and proximity of ammo
storage to population centers - weighs heavily against
granting U.S. forces access. In addition, due to former
colonialization, Southeast Asian countries are very wary of
"4 18% of the Japanese polled favored an immediate
pullout. Factors cited that would trigger anti-Americanism
included defeat of the LDP, increasing nationalism, economic
recession, and trade policies.
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the sovereignty-compromising aspects of a foreign military
presence and remain sensitive to foreign intrusiveness."
A final point brought forward in the CNA study was
political-military considerations. In short, CNA asked if
there is anything more to be gained by configuring United
States forces and operations for greater political
effectiveness and access without dangerously compromising
military effectiveness? [Ref 62] The Secretary of Defense's
Bottom Up Review, September 1993, stated that operational
readiness was the number one priority in the defense program.
Clearly, adjustments to political commitments may have to be
made.
In the meantime, the government of Singapore has
agreed to expand United States military access to existing
Singaporean facilities and host Seventh Fleet's logistics
command. 4" The Republic of the Philippines has authorized the
United States military access for the purpose of carrying out
the Mutual Defense Treaty (as long as the Philippine
government is notified ahead of time). The United States has
also been offered limited access for repairs, replenishment
and training in Australia, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia.
46 Southeast Asian countries feel about independence the
way that Americans feel about freedom.
47 The United States has been granted one pier and some
hangar space for storing one squadron of F-16s along with
repair parts.
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In addition, Brunei is considering building a aircraft
training site for local training by all nations.
For future reference and potential accessibility
sites, a dissertation completed by Katherine Webb on overseas
bases, with particular reference to United State's facilities
in the Philippines, provided alternative locations for
accessibility of United States forces. [Ref. 631 The criteria
she used for evaluating Navy alternatives for ship repair
included a large harbor (approximately 10 ships), a large
labor force and a nearby military use airfield. The criteria
she used for Naval supply operations were a harbor capable of
handling container shipping and a nearby airfield. The
criteria used for Naval magazine operations includes 90 acres
of unencumbered land near water and within 3 days sailing time
of the Subic Repair Facility. The criteria used for Naval air
maintenance and training operations were a large military use
airfield and its proximity to a large harbor. Tables 11
through 14 provide the results of her efforts.
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TABLE 11
ACCESSIBILITY ALTERNATIVES FOR SHIP REPAIR
Facility Status*
Facility Repair&
Alternative Type** Harbor SupplV Magazine Airfield
Perth, Australia C E E E E+
Guam M E# E+ E E+
Surabaya, Indonesia C/M E# D D E+
Sasebo, Japan C/M E E E D
Yokosuka, Japan C/M E E E E
Pusan, Korea C E E D E+
Yosu, Korea C/M E D D E+
Labuan, Malaysia C E# D D E+
Lumut, Malaysia M E# D D E+
Penang, Malaysia C/M E# D E E+
Karachi, Pakistan C E D D E+
Palau M E D D D
Ch'ingtao, PRC C E D D E+
Singapore C/M E E E E
Taipei, Taiwan C E E D E
Sattahip, Thailand C/M E# D D D
Songkhla, Thailand C/M E# D D E+
Tinian M E# D D D
* E=exists, D=must be developed
** C=commercial, M=military
+ Expansion needed to handle large numbers of aircraft (i.e.,
carrier air wing)
# Harbor size sufficient but needs dredging or other expansion
to handle all U.S. combatants
Source: Webb, Katherine. Are Overseas Bases Worth the Bucks?
RAND Graduate School, 1993.
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TABLE 12
ACCESSIBILITY ALTERNATIVES FOR NAVAL SUPPLY OPERATIONS
Facility Facility Access to
Alternative Type* Status** Airfield**
Perth, Australia C E+ E
Diego Garcia M E+ E
Guam M E+ E
Surabaya, Indonesia C/M D E÷
Ishigaki, Japan C/M D++ E
Sasebo, Japan C/M D++ E
Mombassa, Kenya C D E
Pusan, Korea C E E
Yosu, Korea C/M E+ E
Labuan, Malaysia C D E÷
Penang, Malaysia C E E
Lumut, Malaysia M E+ E+
Karachi, Pakistan C D E
Palau M D D
Ch'ingtao, PRC C D E+
Singapore C E E
Taipei, Taiwan C E E
Sattahip, Thailand C/M D D
Songkhla, Thailand C/M D E
Tinian M D D
* C=commercial, M=military
** E=exist, D=must be developed
+ Some expansion of facilities needed
++ Development already under consideration by the Japanese
Source: Webb, Katherine. Are Overseas Bases Worth the Bucks?
RAND Graduate School, 1993.
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TABLE 13
ACCESSIBILITY ALTERNATIVES FOR NAVAL MAGAZINE OPERATIONS
Facility Facility
Alternative Status* Capacitv**
Darwin, Australia D 1
Guam D 1
Surabaya, Indonesia D 1
Sasebo, Japan E 1/4
Labuan, Malaysia D 1
Lumut, Malaysia E 1/2
Palau D 1
Subic Bay, Philippines E 1
Singapore E 1/4
Taipei, Taiwan D 1/2
Sattahip, Thailand D 1/2
Songkhla, Thailand D 1/2
Tinian D 1
* E=exists, D=must be developed
** Capacity is relative to Subic Bay which equals 1.
Source: Webb, Katherine. Are Overseas Bases Worth the
Bucks? RAND Graduate School, 1993.
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TABLE 14




Alternatives Type** Status* Repair Supply MAG
Perth, Australia M D+ E E D
Diego Garcia M D+ D E E
Guam M D+ E++ E E++
Surabaya, Indonesia M D D D D
Atsugi, Japan M E E E E
Ishigaki, Japan M E+ D D D
Sasebo, Japan M D E E++ E
Kimhae, Korea C/M D+ D D D
Butterworth, Malaysia M E++ E E E
Labuan, Malaysia M D D D D
Palau M D D D D
Singapore C E++ E E E
CCK, Taiwan M E++ E E E
Hat-Yai, Thailand C/M D+ D D D
U-Tapao, Thailand M D D D D
Tinian M D D D D
Moli M D - E -
* E=exists, D=must be developed
** C=commercial operations, M=military operations
+ Airfield exists but repair facilities do not and additional
ramp space is probably needed.
+÷ Airfield and facilities exist but some expansion is
probably necessary to handle the volume of U.S. traffic.
Source: Webb, Katherine. Are Overseas Bases Worth the Bucks?
RAND Graduate School, 1993.
3. From Collective Defense Treaty system to
Xultilateralism
President Clinton reaffirmed the United States
political commitment to its security treaties with South
Korea, Japan, Australia, the Philippines and Thailand during
his visit to Seoul in July 1993. In doing so, he correctly
pointed out that these treaties are bilateral in nature, and
do not constitute any semblance of a collective defense treaty
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system, in reality or rhetoric, in the post-cold war era."'
Legally, however, these bilateral treaties only commit the
signatories to "consult together" in case of danger, and to
"take action in accordance with constitutional processes" in
the event of external aggression.
As domestic budgetary constraints increase in the
coming years, United States political commitments may have to
be brought back in line with military and economic
capabilities. Cold war friends and allies will be forced to
accept that bilateral treaties are, in essence, simply
redundancies of the articles provided for in the Charter of
the United Nations (which was put on hold due to the nature of
the Cold War). Therefore, the challenge and opportunity for
the United States is to re-emphasize its political commitment
to multilateral security arrangements, as outlined in the
United Nations Charter, so that outdated Cold War bilateral
security treaties can finally be laid to rest.
Multilateralism stands for a long held but rarely
achieved ideal: the voluntary cooperation of nations for
peace and development.(Ref. 64]With the changing
international security environment and renewed prominence of
the United Nations, the scope of United Nations efforts has
widened the potential for greater United States participation
"I During the Cold War, these treaties were normally
defined as a web binding all signatories to act in joint
responses similar to NATO.
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and suprort for preventive diplomacy and/or collective
security.[Ref 381 Inis Claude points out that
a revitalized United Nations may, by facilitating
negotiation and cooperation and by developing its
potential as a central service agency (Peacetime
Engagement), contribute substantially to solution of
problems distinct from, and in most instances not directly
related to, aggression. The major value of a resurgent
world organization can be expected to derive not from
increased power to coerce states, but from expanded
usefulness to states.[Ref. 65]
Multilateral cooperation will undoubtedly take
unexpected forms and ad hoc coalitions will be required to
deal with specific regional contingencies. However, renewed
efforts at multilateralism for dialogues can provide
confidence-building measures for global and regional powers,
create a new sense of openness between North-South and East-
West relations, work towards decentralizing the overwhelmed
United Nations bureaucracy," 9 increase global pluralism, and
provide forums for open, "cooperative competition".[Ref 73]
In this manner, regional balances of power, whether bipolar or
multipolar, can be stabilized without excessive American
intervention. As Earl Ravenal states,
American intervention encourages regional countries to
hang back, perhaps placating urgent and personal American
presidential appeals with small or even token gestures of
"49 Chapter VIII, Articles 52-54, of the Charter of the
United Nations calls for "regional arrangements or agencies
for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of
international peace and security as are appropriate for
regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies
and their activities are consistent with the purposes and
principles of the United Nations."
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cooperation, and watch the Americans do the geopolitical
work they should be doing for themselves.[Ref 61]
While regional multilateral diplomacy may be far more
difficult for Washington in the absence of being able to
dominate as it once did5", other EA/P regional powers are
highly sensitive to regional opinion (peer pressure) and fear
isolation.[Ref. 66] Therefore, the United States has a
significant opportunity to build ad hoc coalitions (through
consensus building) that support common goals and interests
among regional nations, reduce the so-called free-ride of some
Asian nations at America's expense, and increase the openness
of political posturing by encouraging all regional countries
to speak for themselvei.[Ref 661 As Takashi Inoguchi points
out,
Multilateralism places Japan in a slightly different
context, allowing it to mobilize support from other
countries by propounding a certain set of policy ideas.
It allows Japan to be a banner-weaver. Whether Japan wins
support or not in a multilateral context is not an issue
for Japan. When it wins the majority, that is fine. When
not, one can bemoan the lack of appreciation shown for the
country's policy initiative. [Ref. 67]
4. Reassessment of Security Assistance
The FY1994 security assistance budget request
reoriented resources based upon functional categories rather
than traditional bilateral payments to friends and allies for
so As Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of State for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs, has pointed out, the United States
will have to Listen more and talk less. The wisdom of
following is sometimes superior to that of leading.
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base and facility accessibility. These functional categories
include Middle East Peace, Defense Cooperation and Regional
Security, Economic Development, Counter-Narcotics,
Peacekeeping, Non-proliferation and disarmament, and
Democratic Development.[Ref. 681 Table 15 breaks
down FY 1994 Security Assistance for the East Asia and
Pacific region. The security assistance report submitted to
Congress also asked for legislative assistance in revising the
1961 Foreign Aid and 1976 Export Control Act.
D. NON-MILITARY POLICY CHANGES
Realizing that the post-Cold war era is going to be more
competitive in economic than military terms, the mighty United
States must update its economic productivity and influence to
match its vaunted military power. Non-military security
policies will need to be expanded and reshaped from strictly
bilateral relationships to global and regional multinational
programs. This can be seen in the renewed emphasis on
restructuring foreign aid, adherence to global programs, such
as GATT, the IMF, and the World Bank, a renewed emphasis on
multinational, regional forums for economic prosperity, such
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1. Changes in Aid/Economic Assistance Programs
'Only by giving the American taxpayer a return on our
foreign aid investment can we build a broad-based
constituency for foreign aid. Only by understanding the
marriage of our economic and foreign policy goals, can we
realize them in the decade ahead.' 5' [Ref. 69]
The basic point of departure for a new mutual aid
rationale should be a shift in emphasis away from short-term
objectives and toward longer-term economic objectives. [Ref 701
Strengthened trade and investment relationships with
developing countries constitute not only good development
strategy but the basis for good, long-term foreign policy as
well.(Ref 70]
United States economic assistance can provide direct
support to United States exports. This can be done by tying
aid projects to procurement in the United States, similar to
the approach the Japanese have used.[Ref. 70] Another
way that economic assistance can be more effectively used is
in basing the aid on developmentally sound infrastructure
projects, in lieu of cash transfers.5 2 [Ref 70]
Infrastructure (communications, transportation, power-
generation) projects, financed either through grants or low-
interest concessionary loans, provide direct assistance to the
$' Statement by Senator David Boren.
52 In the past, cash transfers essentially enhanced the
financial power of the central government instead of the
private sector, provided a cushion to permit the postponement
of unpopular but necessary economic reforms, and undermined
the efforts of reform-minded governments.
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private sector and the United States. As a developing
country's infrastructure increases, the costs associated with
trade decreases, the potential for investment from the private
sector increases, and the country becomes more stable, hence
contributing to international security. This is basically the
approach the Japanese used to build up the economies of East
and Southeast Asia, and is currently used by all other major
aid donors.
In a draft given to Congress late November 1993, the
Clinton administration has proposed its new foreign aid
program. This new approach will attempt to coordinate all
federal agencies with international programs (which can
enhance multinational donor cooperation, i.e., United Nations,
OECD and multinational development banks) and place all
international aid programs under the Department of State.
[Ref. 71] The policy objectives of the new foreign
assistance program are as follows:
"* Promoting sustainable development by encouraging economic
growth, population control and protection of the
environment.
"* Promoting democracy by aiding fledgling democracies,
especially with training. Aid would be cut off to any
nation in which a military coup overthrows an elected
government.
"* Promoting peace by aiding regional defense groupings and
anti-drug efforts and rewarding nations that refrain from
developing weapons of mass destruction.
"* Providing humanitarian assistance by creating an emergency
refugee and migration assistance fund.
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"* Promoting growth through trade and investment by
coordinating the work of the Export-Import Bank, the
Overseas Private Investment Corp. and other international
development agencies with the aid program.
"* Advancing diplomacy by specifying that the secretary of
state directs policy for all U.S. international aid
programs, not only in the Agency for International
Development but also in such related agencies as the
Overseas Private Investment Corp and the Export-Import
Bank. [Ref 71]
2. Adherence to Global Programs
A major commitment by the United States to project
financing for its bilateral mutual aid program would enable a
more active United States role in aid donor coordination. [Ref
70] Multilateral development banks (MDBs) have the advantage
of making project loans on an untied basis, subject to
international competitive bidding. Since the United States
played the historic role in bringing the MDBs into existence
and nurturing them over the last 50 years, the United States
has significance influence over the policies of the MDBs.
Despite political and managerial problems, MDBs make
a significant contribution to shared global goals.
[Ref. 72] In addition, a dynamic, thriving, and
export-led United States industry can utilize United States
membership in the MDBs in ways that will help stimulate
greater growth and new markets. (Ref 72] In short, United
States jobs, productivity, research and development,
investment and business arrangements are all capable of being
promoted via United States membership in MDBs.[Ref 72]
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In addition to the MDBs, other Ocooperative
competition"[Ref. 73] regimes, including the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund, are all established networks in
which the United States has enormous influence and through
which it can pursue cooperative competition. While not
suggesting any surrender of United States sovereignty to any
international regime, United States strategy should seek to
extend leverage through cooperative international
organizations to shape and restrain the form of regional
competition.[Ref 73]
3. Participation in Regional Multinational Programs
The United States' trade, investment, and military
ties in the EA/P region are vital to its economic health and
overall security.[Ref. 741 Thus, in order to maintain a
regional economic balance of power favorable to the United
States, the United States must start working with the Pacific
Basin countries to ensure economic prosperity favorable to all
concerned.
ASEAN governments support private sector
entrepreneurial growth, domestic and foreign investment, and
an open world trading system. U.S. business people have found
ASEAN countries good places to trade and invest. 53  In
53 While some assume that Southeast Asian countries are
simply flying geese (taking after the Japanese economic
model), it is important to remember that economies are shaped
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December 1990, the U.S. Trade Representative and ASEAN
ambassadors signed a memorandum of understanding to establish
regular, ministerial-level trade consultations and a working
group of senior officials to explore mechanisms to enhance
trade and investment relations under a program known as the
ASEAN-U.S. Initiative. (Ref. 751 However, as economic and
trade competition continues to build in the coming decade, a
renewed effort will be required to encourage regions to remain
outward looking for economic growth. The best avenue to
pursue for multinational economic cooperation in the EA/P
region is the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).
APEC was established in 1989 at the prodding of
Australia and Canada. This multinational consensus
organization is one building block towards global trade (not
a regional trading block). The purpose of APEC is to promote
freer trade and investment patterns to increase the economic
prosperity for all concerned. Its unofficial correspondent is
the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), founded by
Canberra in 1980 (the business community has long ago figured
out that future outward-looking economic development requires
extensive cooperation between Asia-Pacific nations).
[Ref. 76]
by social and political cultures. Southeast Asian political
and social cultures are very diverse and hardly a replica of
Japan.
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Despite the Asian preference to keep arrangements
loose, informal, and evolving slowly in a non-legalistic
manner, President Clinton invited all the heads of state of
members of the APEC to its annual meeting held in Seattle in
November 1993. The only head of state to abstain from the
meeting was Malaysia's Prime Minister Mahatir.5 '
Nevertheless, the meeting was successful in that it was the
first time all these heads of state had sat down together in
an informal setting. In addition, Indonesia's President
Suharto, who will hold the annual APEC meeting in 1994, has
extended an invitation to all the heads of state, once again.
The importance of APEC to support cooperative economic
competition in the future is only beginning to be realized by
some Asia-Pacific governments. For one, the best way to
address trade imbalances between Japan and other countries
will be through multilateral arrangements. South Korea and
other Asian countries complain about many of the same
practices that American companies cite, like Tokyo's export
policies and the barriers to selling foreign products in
Japan. Over the last four years,
Japan's trade surplus with East Asia has more than doubled
to $42 billion in 1992 from $18 billion in 1989. Japan's
exports to East Asia - $116.4 billion - now far exceed the
country's exports to the United States. (Ref. 77]
54 Prime Minister Mahatir fears that an informal summit
meeting would subsequently institutionalize APEC, causing
ASEAN members to lose their voice in economic and trade issues
as the power base shifts to Washington.
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Indeed, Suh Sang Nok, a member of the National Assembly and a
key policy advisor to South Korea's President Kim Young Sam,
has stated that
Everyone in the world has the same problem with Japan. It
gets to be a friendship and a philosophy issue. [Ref 77)
Secondly, APEC can help push China towards complying
with GATT principles and receive GATT membership. Beijing is
very aware of Japanese gains at the expense of the United
States, but the importance it attributes to the development of
Sino-U.S. relations remains substantial as both countries
share common interests on an extensive scale.ss
[Ref. 78] With current United States problems with
trade relations with China, APEC can be an instrumental
channel for negotiations.
In addition, without underestimating the role of
Japan, the major economies of the region which are
predominantly Chinese, in addition to mainland China, include
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore.
This economic epicenter for commerce and finance contains
substantial capital, technology, and manufacturing
capability (Taiwan), outstanding marketing and a services
acumen (Hong Kong), a fine communications network
(Singapore), and large endowments of land, resources, and
labor (mainland China).(Ref. 79]
Similar to Japanese methods, these rapidly developing Pacific
rim countries are turning to suppliers, often on a family
"s According to Party secretary Jiang Zemin, there is no
fundamental conflict of interest between the U.S. and China,
and neither side poses a threat to the other.
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basis, within their own region for their imports. These newly
developing countries now buy 33 percent of their imports from
other nations within the region, compared to less than 24
percent in 1985.(Ref 79] As such, APEC can help apply
pressure or transparency, as required.
Thirdly, with respect to international trade of
merchandise, the Pacific Basin is more dynamic and even more
integrated than is the European Community. (Ref. 80] Lawrence
Krause believes that
developments in Europe will push countries in the Pacific
Basin to give more structure to their region in order to
be able to exercise countervailing power. Nevertheless
... constructive relations can be established between the
European region and the Pacific Basin region. [Ref 801
Therefore, through APEC, the United States can work to
facilitate an open trade balance between regions based on
GATT. In addition, during July 1993 ASEAN Post Ministerial
Conference, the ASEAN members and the United States agreed to
lay the groundwork for linkages between AFTA and NAFTA.
(Ref. 81] A joint study on AFTA-NAFTA links is to be
conducted by ASEAN and the United States in 1994.
Finally, economic relations in the region are not a
zero sum game, but they cannot be taken for granted,
especially now that trade frictions will no longer be subdued
by the more critical security arrangements that obtained under
the Cold War.(Ref. 82] Almost all Asian countries have
adopted industrial policies in their economic development
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models.5 6 APEC and the PECC can help ease economic conflict
by insisting that all parties abide by the same principles in
pursuing economic growth and allowing for the coordination of
industrial policies between all countries. APEC can provide
these principles through trade and investment frameworks to
move from consultation to working on problems.
4. Expanded Cultural Exchanges
Cultural exchanges have increased the mutual
under3tanding of peoples in the United States and abroad.
Grass roots level exchanges, especially, indicate America's
sincerity in helping all other peoples meet their basic needs
and, when and where possible, improve their living standards.
Two programs I will address are the United States Information
Agency (USIA) and the United States Peace Corps.
As stated by Joseph Duffey, director of the USIA, the
foundation of multinational trade talks such as APEC
begins with cross-cultural student exchange programs ...
what foreign and American student learn from each other
may be intangible; but it is of no less importance.
Foreign students bring to the US vitality, energy, and new
ideas. In turn, they experience the debate, tumult, and
freedom of a democratic, ethnically diverse, free-market
society. (Ref. 831
As pointed out by Joseph Duffey, five of the fifteen heads of
government at the APEC multinational trade meeting in Seattle,
November 1993, had received education at American
56 Australia and Japan have both coordinated their
industrial policies with ASEAN countries during their annual
economic ministers meetings.
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institutions. While these leaders may not necessarily imbue
America's democratic values, cross-cultural education has
provided them insight into our ideals and values, and left
them with prerogative to implement (or not) learned ideas and
values from abroad as applicable to their own societies.
The Peace Corps was established to help (1) the
peoples of other countries meet their needs for trained
manpower, particularly the basic needs of those living in the
poorest areas of such countries; (2) promote a better
understanding of the American people on the part of the
peoples served; and (3) promote a better understanding of
other peoples on the part of the American people. [Ref 50]
In 1985, Congress mandated the objective of staffing the Peace
Corps with 10,000 individuals. To date, it has been an
unrealizable goal. Due to budgetary constraints and low
visibility, the Peace Corps has not received the attention it
deserves. It has been unable to recruit sufficient volunteers
with specialized skills (i.e., doctors, engineers,
agronomists) and minority backgrounds. In addition,
assignments have not been developed based on host country
needs, indicating that oversight (or priorities) has been
somewhat lacking.[Ref 50] As the United States reduces the
numbers of its military personnel, the Peace Corps could
provide an alternative route for service-aspiring minority and
less privileged students who possess specialized skills
desired by the Peace Corps. The General Accounting office has
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even recommended that a ROTC program be developed for Peace
Corps volunteers.
5. From Friends and Allies to Other Nations
David Fromkin believes that the first question to ask
about any alliance commitment - a commitment to go to war in
given future circumstances - is why make it?(Ref. 84]
if we are not prepared to decide in advance when we will
go to war, we ought not to have treaties which purport to
be treaties of mutual defense or alliance. Such treaties
begin by fooling others, who mistakenly think we have
agreed to defend them; they end by fooling us, when
apparent treaty commitments generate political pressures
which impel us to defend foreign countries despite the
lack of any legal treaty commitment to do so. (Ref 84]
In the post-cold war era, there is no clear and
present threat that the United States can commit itself to go
to war against. Future priorities will differ from state to
state within the EA/P region, depending upon particular
problems and immediate needs.(Ref 85] The United States must
remain flexible in shifting tactics and strategies to
accomplish its own objectives, and the help of other nations
will be required, depending upon the nature of the priority. [Ref. 85]
George Washington's Farewell Address, partially outlined
below, warns against political attachments to nations and
continues to provide concrete guidance for the conduct of
international relations.
Nothing is more essential than that permanent, inveterate
antipathies against particular nations and passionate
attachments for others should be excluded; and that in
place of them just and amicable feelings towards all
should be cultivated. - The Nation, which indulges towards
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another an habitual hatred or an habitual fondness, is in
some degree a slave. It is a slave to its animosity or to
its affection, either of which is sufficient to lead it
astray from its duty and its interest ... Sympathy for the
favorite nation, facilitating the illusion of an imaginary
common interest in cases where no real common interest
exists, and infusing into one the enmities of the other,
betrays the former into a participation in the quarrels
and wars of the latter, without adequate inducement or
justification: It leads also to concessions to the
favorite nation of privileges denied to others, which is
apt doubly to injure the Nation making the concessions; by
unnecessarily parting with what ought to have been
retained, and by exciting jealously, ill-will, and a
disposition to retaliate, in the parties from whom equal
privileges are withheld; and it gives to ambitious,
corrupted, or deluded citizens, (who devote themselves to
the favorite nation) facility to betray, or sacrifice the
interests of their own country ... [Ref 14]
a. Hew Attitudea Towards the Non-aligned Countriea
As part of the upheaval in the international
system, the United States has become more receptive to the
concerns and opinions of the non-aligned countries. This is
evident in the support given ASEAN towards the creation of the
regional security forum along with hearing the concerns of
President Suharto, President of the Non-aligned movement,
during the G-7 meeting in Tokyo in June 1993.
In order to continue to promote and protect
fundamental national interests in the post-Cold War era, the
United States needs to harness the goodwill of other nations.
To due this, the United States must now build relationships
with the non-aligned where interests converge and allow for
flexibility where they diverge.
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While evolving slowly, ASEAN has picked up the ball
on regional security issues. The critical factor for them
will be in how Japan will be able to fit into the arrangement.
While Japan's role is now primarily economic, Tokyo wants to
add a political dimension. The question for ASEAN and Japan
in the 1990s is how to define that role. Most countries in
the region, and indeed many Japanese, would prefer that Tokyo
eschew the status of a military power. Most would also be
more comfortable with Japan's working in concert with others
or the United Nations, as it has done in Cambodia, rather than
unilaterally. The parameters will be defined through an
ongoing debate within Japan and discussion between Tokyo and
its neighbors. Today there is no firm consensus either in
Japan, in the region or across the Pacific on what Japan's
role should be.[Ref. 861
The United States can best contribute towards
regional security dialogue by supporting the progress made and
offering advice and direction when asked. At the same time,
though, the United States should insist that Asian countries
solve their diverse security problems on their own.
[Ref. 87] This may also be achieved by urging South
Korea and Australia to play mediator roles between ASEAN and
Japan and ASEAN and China.[Ref. 88]
One other turn for the United States in regards to
the non-aligned, is rethinking its previous opposition to a
SEANWFZ. Making Southeast Asia a region where the
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manufacture, acquisition and storage of nuclear weapons was
forbidden, would help prevent the spread of nuclear arms.
[Ref. 891 During the July 1993 ASEAN PMC, United States
Secretary of State Warren Christopher was assured that
the treaty would preserve all existing rights of passage
through international sealanes and airspace in Southeast
Asia for foreign ships and aircraft even if they carried
nuclear weapons. Individual countries in the region that
signed the treaty would also be able to decide for
themselves whether to allow access to their ports and
airfields for foreign ships and aircraft carrying nuclear
weapons. [Ref 891
b. Special Problem Inherent in the Rapid Growth of
China
The rapid growth of China, if it continues, may be
the most important trend in the world for the next century.
[Ref. 901 The most populous country in the world sits on the
United Nations Security Council, has the third largest global
economy,s7 maintains a small (relative to the United States
and Russia) but capable nuclear arsenal, and is rapidly
improving its military-industrial capabilities.
Whether or not China will manage to break into the
global scene as a major military-industrial power remains to
be seen. However, the implications either way could be
disastrous. If reforms falter, civil war, a military coup, or
warlord chaos could break out. [Ref 901 Consequences could
"s World Bank estimates in terms of purchasing power
parity ranks the United States first at $5.61 trillion, Japan
second at $2.37 trillion, and China third at $2.35 trillion.
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include warlords or a military regime with nuclear weapons,
major emigration that would impose a heavy burden on Japan,
Korea, Southeast Asia, and potentially the United States. (Ref
90] A civil war could also ignite simmering ethnic and
religious tensions on China's western borders, completely
engulfing East as well as Central Asia in major civil unrest.
If, on the other hand, China is able to sustain its
economic reforms, with Chinese political reforms someday
catching up,
'The size of China's displacement of the world balance is
such that the world must find a new balance in 30 to 40
years.'[Ref 901
Is there reason for alarm in China's rise in
relative power? For most of recorded history, China has been
more developed, prosperous, sophisticated and civilized than
the West.(Ref 90] However, due to the past two hundred years
of history, China shares with turn-of-the-century Germany the
sense of wounded pride, the annoyance of a giant that has been
battered and cheated by the rest of the world. [Ref 90) If
history teaches us anything, it is that war is the result of
redressing perceived injustices due to the difficulty that the
world has in accommodating newly powerful nations.(Ref 90]
Comprehensive engagement5 8  of China will contribute
significantly to global peace and stability by accommodating
"58 Term used in November 1993 by Secretary of State Warren
Christopher and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs Winston Lord.
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China's rise in the global and regional balance of power
politics game, ensuring that appropriate limits of power are
established for all major powers, and inhibiting fascist
nationalism that could occur if China is continuously shunned
by the "Western" world.
6. From Containment of Coinn Enemies to Engagent on
Conon Interests
In the century or more before 1941 the United States and
Great Britain had no treaty of alliance, but acted as
allies none the less. Where identity of interests exists
between the parties, a treaty usually is not necessary;
where it does not exist, often a treaty is not kept. [Ref
84]
The United States can no longer pretend to build
security frameworks on containing common enemies. It must
begin to build security frameworks based on common interests
such as the welfare of human beings, economic prosperity,
environmental protection, freer trade, and non-proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction. In the post-Cold war era,
all of the Southeast Asian states have declared that
economic success is there number one priority. ... This
region-wide concentration on economic prosperity ... is
making the national interests of individual Southeast
Asian countries more aligned with each other. [Ref 6]
As the national interests of individual countries are more
aligned with one another, the likelihood of war between them
decreases.[Ref 61
While United States National Security Advisor Anthony
Lake calls this enlargement, [Ref. 91] there is no need to
restrict enlargement to those countries described as
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democratic market economies (continuing the personality-based,
Cold War ideological paradigm). This policy may be more
realistic, more inclusive, less prejudicial and more
internationally acceptable if enlargement was based upon open
market-driven societies"9 with peaceful coexistence as the
ultimate goal.
Multilateral dialogues based on common interests are
already being pursued by South Korea, Japan, the United
States, and China in approaching the nuclear issue of North
Korea. As part of this evolving process, South Korean
Foreign Minister Han Sungjoo has called for a "mini-CSCE" in
Northeast Asia. The "mini-CSCE" could potentially take up not
only security issues but also political and economic problems
on an issue-by-issue approach to manage and prevent crisis and
conflict. [Ref. 92] When Secretary of State Warren
Christopher discussed the "mini-CSCE" with South Korean
Foreign Minister Han in July 1993 (prior to the ASEAN PMC),
they
agreed to work together for security cooperation in the
region ... (and that) this subregional security dialogue
can go together with and possibly complement the ongoing
regional security consultations at the ASEAN-PMC.
[Ref. 93]
In Southeast Asia, similar multilateral arrangements
for preventive diplomacy are being pursued by ASEAN.
"s Expressed in this manner, each state can be free to
provide its own perception of open market-driven societies
(which the United States calls democracy), without exposing
the United States to charges of cultural imperialism.
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The purpose is completely different than the purpose you
had in Europe during the Cold War. Here we are not
forming blocs against a common enemy. We are having
potential enemies, potential antagonists, sitting around
the table talking to each other directly.
[Ref. 94]
At the July 1993 ASEAN PMC, the foreign ministers
noted a convergence of views among participants on the
need to find ways to promote consultations on regional
political and security issues. [Ref. 95]
The ASEAN foreign ministers endorsed a proposal of the senior
officials to invite China, Laos, Papua New Guinea, Russia and
Vietnam to meet ASEAN ministers and dialogue partners (United
States, European Community, Canada, Australia, New Zealand,
and South Korea) at the ASEAN Regional Forum in Bangkok next
year. [Ref 95] The climax of the meeting came when ASEAN
ministers agreed to establish an advisory council for security
cooperation. The new body - called the Council for Security
Cooperation in Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) - will allow military and
intelligence officials to meet in a private capacity with
security specialists from universities and research institutes
to draw up proposals on dispute settlement and confidence
building for governments to consider. [Ref. 961
Significantly, Malaysia's defence minister called "for the
region to treat China as a partner instead of a threat" and
Sarasin Viraphol, a Director-General in the Thai Foreign
Ministry, said that
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without an alternative to replace or supplement the Cold
War security structure of military alliances anchored by
the United States, the economic gains achieved by East
Asia over the past few decades could be jeopardized.[Ref
96]
While there is ample evidence of the possibility to
build forums for security dialogue in the EA/P region, any
attempt to build a collective security defense structure in
Asia, similar to NATO, should be avoided as extremely
premature. Southeast Asia is adamantly against turning ASEAN
into any form of a defense alliance (they do not collectively
perceive China or Japan as a threat), and historical distrust
between Japan, Korea and China prohibits the formation of any
collective security alliance in Northeast Asia.' 0
[Ref. 97]
60 Informal academic discussions by military officers on
maritime collective security measures in East Asia have been
conducted by the Center for International Security and Arms
Control at Stanford University. Russia, Japan, and the United
States were represented at the first session. Russia, China,
and the United States were represented at the second session.
Tokyo would not authorize a naval officer to attend the second
session due to the presence of a Chinese naval officer.
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VI. CONCLUSION: TMZ ROAD AHEAD
Realizing that the best contribution to global peace and
stability starts at home, the United States must continue to
pull itself out of the last thirty years of slow-motion
economic and social decay. While the United States has global
responsibilities, its resources are limited and
responsibilities must begin by protecting its people at home.
Establishing a balanced budget (the same as each American
does), shifting to a consumption-based tax system, adopting a
limited (yet adequate) industrial policy, paying off an
enormous national debt, and reinvigorating the American people
with the civic values that must be fostered to secure the
American experiment can no longer be placed on the back
burner. Leadership begins by example.
Abroad, long range trends indicate that the United States
will be actively involved and committed in EA/P stability and
progress. United States national interests in the region are
significant and rapidly growing. As the United States
continues its efforts at economic renewal, fresh approaches
and new security frameworks, built on common interests, must
be fostered to consider the interests and concerns of all
nations.
Southeast Asia is developing in its own way, at its own
pace, and will "democratize" as conditions allow. The
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dislocations between the market-driven countries and the
former centrally-planned countries are enormous. In addition,
the interests of Southeast Asian nations are not always
compatible with ours. While the United States continues to
capitalize on its peace dividend, the countries of Southeast
Asia will been forced to pick up any perceived slack in
American presence that may be seen as a security vacuum, or
wait for China or Japan to pick it up for them. It does not
appear that Southeast Asia is going to allow that to happen.
The countries are cooperating more in open defense
arrangements, military to military exercises, and joint
planning for humanitarian or disaster relief operations.
Clearly, the United States can no longer be their security
guarantor.
There must be a constant and continuing reassessment of
our national interests. Just how long can the United States
claim global leadership, when so much leadership has been
lacking at home. How long can the United States keep pushing
for global democracy when it could not even build one in the
Philippines? How long can the United States continue to push
its values on others without being susceptible to charges of
cultural imperialism? Even George Washington was ready to
turn the military loose on United States citizens for failing
to respect constitutionally derived laws and disrupting unity
and domestic tranquility. Most Southeast Asian countries do
not have over two hundred years of independence under their
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belt, and Asian countries that do, such as China or Japan, may
even have something to teach us at home.
Future policy making can no longer be a one-way street, as
was done during the Cold War. Security planners must give
constant consideration to the interests and images of other
concerned nations. The United States does not always know
what is best for other countries. The United States must
learn to listen more, and talk less.
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APPENDIX D. UNITED STATES EXPORTS TO ASIA
{In millions of dollars}
1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 .1992
1UML ASIA 6599 9795 22575 28339 502D5 627T3 U9094 132
aM 465 1067(9 I M -4M -47
MM WA1A 3W 2U157 T60 M TM 914M
SanEAST ASIA 978 148 191- 49 Of 1E7 I O
ASEN 63MU 31 4645 98 T~f 11 MW
CM~ AMA* 1707 -W -M M TM Mg _0
JAFPq 0.36 0.47 0.47 0.45 0.42 0.43 0.41 0.36
MM___ T 0- U.7- 0.0-7 0.11 iTU 0.106 0.12 0.11
___ CI T -T 0. 1-4 T0.09 U.TU -0- -61- -0.
ALBUMM 070 0.10d 06.10 06.1-0 06.09 0.09 -07f -60-
NEW~LI 0EMT-- .01.02 1 .2 0.0-1 60- 0. 0-1 -0 ff '
_______ 0SA .15 06.1-5 0.1-7 0.1-7 0..2- __.1_ __.1_ _1
ASEAN 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.16 0.3 20.1 0I .1-6 0-.18
SASIA 0.2-5 06.1-0 0. 03 0.07 0.06 0. 05 0. 04 0.03
GFEFM CHDA 466 933 3116 2449 5365 11660 23208 31744
MOM__ 237 977 147 -* -0554- 1I 153)
H2G HM 406 9ý la 24SE 3030 -(f 9
- -M W*** 87 -824- WI2 31056 W7- 740
siniEs ASIA 978 1468 3891 4678 9891 8603 18972 23992
ER9M 24 U1 5 30 34 16 20 4
______2 2 1802
V~I4D 311 352 675 2 32 30 7 5
AWN 63 109 3012 4649 98O 8!97 1894 239Ef
**UE -*35 -79 312f -- -
___M -f U 3 W f -Y7 Z-
3_ 78 373 747 1040 T185 IM
m51 988 146 TU M4 W N
__X 15 369 6-M -9- -10- -M
*OM1 ASThIA Il DMM SGV , SM = FIG, EMN3 mmm~J, afl4 ]NII, KaRM,
**(I EM W AVAUMPE CR tIES W W10i-~
SIR: L!EMMM 1M24M EM) MAX DETEIZIN CF MPM SUSMlI s.
135
APPNIDIX 3. *UNTZ-I STATS GQLOBAL IMPORT$
{In millions of dollars}
1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1992
I [E^VMW 17649 29268 60084 101542 143682 250930 304103 318698
____ 0.35 0.38 0.40 0.34 0.33 0.27 0.31 0.32
ASIA 0. X 0.2M 0.Z 0.2X 0.30 0.36 06.3-3 0.Y
a____ T. 44 06.3-8 0.43 U. 0 .39 06.3-8 -0- N _T_
______ 7798 10469 42Z7 77617 100970 135379 21409 232900
__I -W -0 W9Z -17430 -IM I7I0T
ASIA 19 - ]fm2 -30 WN -f 15M~ MY
MMCE EAr 40 3772 755 IM5 19 -M M7 I17M7
anmm axtmum -W -_2 -l J 7U -E -M
AEREM 0.12 0.10 0.15 0.18 0.17 0.08 0.08 0.06
AS3A -.3-2 0-.2-6 0.2-4 0.Z 0.49 0.54
M=_EART 6.0- 0.04 0.1-2 0.2-5 0. 13 -0.96 .Z Ff
_____ Md.6 1 0.5 6.4 o--7 0.31 -3 T .32 0.31
CmmE 0.03 0. 03 T0.02 T 0.T01- 0.01 -I0.0f0T
TW• DFCM 25630 39963 108012 186050 254882 387075 517020 552616
1OML A¶3A*** 5468 1010-9 25933 47358 7I5 MW -""37
OaML m 7 1 2540 39429 5533 9E737 M --- n.1
OWM ilffR1 HEM 1089 16930 4348 5886 86394 112743 _
ASIA 0.21 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.28 0.41 0.39 0.42
___ 0.K 0.2-8 -2 0.21 TM 0.25 T.M 0.-ff
______ HM 0f f. 4-2 0.4-0 0.3-2 U.3- o0.7 T~ff T.
* JA , BMUfA1AND NN• E ID
** C WIICH RW 97% IS MI EMS ASIA
SIKRE: DM ZEIIW1 FUND. RUML DMMIXQ4 CF 'TL SJXaM~3=.
136
"A•PPEDIX F. UNITED STATS IMXPORTS FROM ASIA
{In millions of dollars}
1966 1970 1974 1978 1962 1986 1990 1992
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APPZNDIX 0. WNITED STATED DIRECT INVESTMENT ABROAD
(In millions of dollars}
FMIE CF FEIM
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APPENDIX H. UNITZD STATES DIRECT INVZSTNENT IN ASIA
(In millions of dollars}
AMHME ANNPRM
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APPENDIX I. UNITED STATES MILITARY FORCES IN FOREIGN AREZAS
{In thousands}
FY64 FY68 FY72 EY76 FYW0 FY82 FY84 FM FY8 FY•0 F 92
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